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The spirits industry is consolidating with more than 40 M&A deals in 14 years. Organic growth 
is not the only priority major players have. In order to maintain their position on top, big 
producers and marketers of spirits have long been following a regular strategy of acquisitions 
and divestitures that allows them to create value for shareholder. In this study, an overview of 
a potential deal between Pernod Ricard S.A. and Beam Inc. is conducted by taking into 
consideration this deal’s place within the academic literature on Valuation and M&A, this 
industry and companies’ characteristics and value drivers, and how these are reflected in the 
assessment of value creation from the deal.  According to the study’s conclusion, Pernod 
Ricard and Beam could create value for its shareholders by merging in a debt financing deal 
that would involve Pernod paying a 19% premium over last year average share price of Beam, 
which  in turn would generate net synergies corresponding to around 8% of Pernod current 
enterprise value. The study concludes with further insights on how this deal could generate 
more value, and how different conditions could affect the viability of the merger. 


















The author would like to express his sincere gratitude to his thesis advisor, Peter Tsvetkov, for 
the constant availability, confidence and helpful feedback. To his work colleagues, friends and 





















David Boquinhas Page 4 
 
Table of Contents 
 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 6 
2.Literature Review ..................................................................................................................... 7 
2.1 Valuation Overview ............................................................................................................ 7 
2.1.1 Valuation Purposes...................................................................................................... 7 
2.1.2 Valuation Models ........................................................................................................ 8 
2.1.2.1 Cash Flow Discounting ....................................................................................... 10 
2.1.2.1.1 DDM and Free Cash Flow Approach – Equity and Firm Specific ......... 11 
2.1.2.1.2 Free Cash Flow Inputs ...................................................................... 12 
2.1.2.2Relative Valuation ............................................................................................... 18 
2.2 M&A Overview ................................................................................................................. 20 
2.2.1 Types of Deals ........................................................................................................... 20 
2.2.2 History and Patterns .................................................................................................. 21 
2.2.3 Synergies and Value Creation .................................................................................... 22 
2.2.4 Performance Fundamentals of M&A ......................................................................... 23 
2.2.5 Cross Border M&A. New wave? More value? ........................................................... 24 
3. Companies and Industry ........................................................................................................ 26 
3.1 Alcoholic Beverage Industry ............................................................................................. 26 
3.2 Pernod Ricard SA .............................................................................................................. 31 
3.3 BEAM Inc.  ........................................................................................................................ 38 
4. Valuations .............................................................................................................................. 44 
4.1 BEAM Valuation ................................................................................................................ 44 
4.1.1 Key Considerations and Value Drivers ....................................................................... 44 
4.1.2 Results and Final Considerations ............................................................................... 51 
4.2 Pernod Ricard Valuation ................................................................................................... 53 
4.2.1 Key Considerations and Value Drivers ....................................................................... 53 
4.2.2 Results and Final Considerations ............................................................................... 59 
5. The Merger ............................................................................................................................ 61 
5.1 The Merged Entity ............................................................................................................ 61 
5.1.1 Consolidation and Cross Border Issues ...................................................................... 61 
5.1.2 Synergies Analysis...................................................................................................... 64 
5.1.3 Synergies Valuation ................................................................................................... 70 
David Boquinhas Page 5 
 
5.2 Aspects of the Deal ........................................................................................................... 72 
5.2.1 Deal’s Rationale ......................................................................................................... 72 
5.2.2 Characteristics of the merger .................................................................................... 73 
5.2.3 Final Considerations .................................................................................................. 74 
6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 76 
7. Appendixes ............................................................................................................................ 77 






















David Boquinhas Page 6 
 
1. Introduction 
The following dissertation proposes a merger between Pernod Ricard S.A. based in France and 
Beam Inc. headquartered in the United States, both major players on the worldwide spirits 
industry. The purpose underlying such proposal is to analyze a concrete case where an M&A 
deal would be possible and to closely study the major steps associated with an operation like 
this. 
The first section of this paper introduces the topics of Valuations and M&A by offering a 
literature review in which the classical studies of these two topics by academics is evaluated as 
well as state of the art approaches which have been gaining territory within the finance 
community. Some of the main characteristics of Valuations and M&A are then critically 
reviewed and the contextualization of the proposed deal within literature is presented.  
In the subsequent section, a thoroughly analysis on the current, as well as historically, state of 
the spirits industry is commenced to afterward fit both of the companies in the context of its 
industry and economic environment. Also, both companies are comprehensively studied in 
order to assess what their value drivers are and how their characteristics can impact each 
company, as well as, ultimately, both firms together. 
The valuations chapter performs the valuation of each standalone company in order to as 
realistically as possible model the key value drivers and opportunities present in each firm, to 
arrive at a fair value of their equity. For that, extensive Valuation methodology was applied 
and compared to real market estimates as to check on whether the models were being 
realistically capturing the public information and estimates made.    
Finally, in the last section, the merger between Pernod Ricard and Beam is valued, relying 
heavily on the inputs given in previous chapters. An M&A operation can be a complex deal and 
distortions to what the deal output may be are common. Therefore, a careful analysis to what 
these companies have to offer to each other was completed, and an in depth analysis on the 
strategic and operational side of the deal was performed. 
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2. Literature Review 
The following literature review offers the possibility to appraise how in recent years the study 
of M&A has been conducted and how revealing it has been. It is not as obvious as it may seem 
that two similar companies merging together will form a better, bigger company. Many times 
they will not. It seems to be about measuring the value of the firms separately, the value of the 
firms together, and as a consequence the added value by the deal that one can assess the 
impact of an M&A transaction.  
The first section will perform an overview on some of the most influential literature on 
valuation approaches, as well as state of the art studies that have been trying to improve 
standard valuation models. Throughout the second section it will be offered the opportunity to 
review some of the main characteristics of M&A deals in literature: how they are classified, 
what is their focus, their contribution to the shareholders, their strategy, motives, history and 
trends that most contribute for how M&A deals are conducted and evaluated in recent years. 
2.1 Valuation Overview 
2.1.1 Valuation Purposes 
Along with some other subjects in Finance literature, valuation has been a “hot topic” for the 
past decades. Research on valuation is extremely vast; however, some methodologies have 
prevailed in detriment of others, although not in a consensual manner. For instance, according 
to Kaplan & Ruback (1996), investment bankers and dealmakers typically price firms and 
transactions using multiples of current earnings or cash flow for comparable companies or 
transactions, while financial academics usually estimate market values of companies and 
transactions by recurring to the discount value of the expected future cash flows. 
There are a multitude of reasons why there is not a single and unique path to value firms and 
transactions, as it could be expected since valuation plays such an important and common role 
in Finance. It should be noticed that valuation is not an exact science with an exact purpose 
and that is why academics and professionals differ in their valuation approaches. Valuation can 
be performed through different methods, with different assumptions, requirements, inputs 
and outputs having nonetheless one final and common goal, which can then serve different 
purposes and reasons. That common goal is to measure value and identify sources of 
economic value creation and destruction within a firm and/or transaction (Fernandez, 2007). 
The identification and measure of the value drivers can then supply a variety of functions 
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depending on who is performing the valuation and which routes and assumptions is using to 
get there. In this sense, it is natural that some methods can be simple, quick and 
straightforward while others can be quite complex (Damodaran, 2002). 
Among the many purposes served in different contexts by valuation methods, some of them 
are naturally more relevant than others. In its overview of Valuation studies, Fernandez (2007) 
described, from the wide range of purposes, the main ones as follows: (1) Public offerings 
(“The valuation is used to justify the price at which the shares are offered to the public”); (2) 
Valuation of listed companies (“The valuation is used to compare the value obtained with the 
share’s price on the stock market and to decide whether to sell, buy or hold shares”); (3) 
Buying and selling operations (For the buyer and for the seller, the valuation will indicate them 
the highest price he should pay and the lowest price he should sell, respectively); (4) 
Compensation schemes based on value creation (“The valuation of a company or business unit 
is fundamental for quantifying the value creation attributable to the executives being 
assessed”); (5) Identification of value drivers (“The valuation of a company or business unit is 
fundamental for identifying and stratifying the main value drivers”); and (6) Strategic decisions 
on company’s continued existence (“The valuation of a company or business unit is a prior step 
in the decision to continue in the business, sell, merge, milk, grow or buy other companies”). 
Valuation in the context of M&A will naturally serve several of the purposes illustrated by 
Fernandez, and as previously mentioned; there are several methods and approaches to 
perform valuations that have been the subject of debate in the literature.  
2.1.2 Valuation Models 
Authors like Damodaran (2002) and Fernandez (2007) used similar classifications to wrap-up 
the many approaches, described in the literature and used by professionals, based on their 
basic methodologies. The authors classify the models, in a summarized way, as follows: 
Main Valuation Methods 
  Balance Sheet E.g., Book Value, Liquidation Value, Substantial Value 
Relative Valuation (Multiples) E.g., PER, EV/EBITDA, EV/Sales, PBV 
Cash Flow Discounting E.g., FCFE, FCFF, DDM, Capital Cash Flow, APV 
Value Creation E.g., EVA, Economic Profit, Cash Value Added 
Options E.g., Black and Scholes, Investment Options 
Table 1: Main Valuation Methods (source: adapted from Fernandez, 2007) 
Notice that these classifications are useful to organize and to be a starting point in studying the 
models used by financiers, however, many authors have different perspectives for each of the 
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models presented, demonstrating how rich the variety of options one can have when 
performing valuation depending on his needs.  
Young et al. (1999) argues that one of the reasons for such an extended variety of approaches 
in valuation is that different models make different features of the valuation clearer at the 
expense of diminishing others, and for this reason, this author offers a way to cut through this 
complexity. In his study, Young affirms that “virtually every popular valuation approach is 
simply a different way of expressing the same underlying model”. Starting off by considering 
four of the main models (Dividend Discount Model, Discounted Cash Flow, Economic Value 
Added and Dynamic ROE), the author of “All roads lead to Rome”, studies the possibility of re-
expressing one model in terms of another in search for the desired common valuation 
approach. His main conclusion seems to be the recognition of similarities among valuation 
approaches, and that there is a trade-off when using different models in the sense that all of 
them offer a partial picture of the valuation. 
In the same line of thought as Young et al. (1999), for instance Oded & Michel (2007), 
concluded that the significant inconsistencies, that occur in valuation literature about 
discounted cash flows approaches such as APV, FCFE, FCFF and Capital Cash Flows, lie on the 
assumptions made about debt rebalancing and when the debt rebalancing policy is applied 
consistently, all valuation methods produce equivalent results.  
There seems to be a well defined place for Discounted Cash Flow variants and approaches in 
Finance literature. The notion that the value of a firm does not lies entirely in its balance sheet, 
that it is not static and therefore takes into account the company’s possible future evolution, 
or money’s time value, contrasts the methods based on Cash Flow discounting with those 
based on Balance Sheet (Fernandez, 2007). Similarly, in its 2001 study “EVA and Cash Value 
added do not measure shareholder value creation”, Fernandez argues that both Income 
Statement and Balance Sheet are historical data and for that reason, it is impossible for 
accounting-based measures, such as EVA or cash value added, to measure value creation, 
which in turn is determined by the changes in expectations regarding the growth of the firm’s 
cash flows and also by the changes in the firm’s risk. This view is largely shared and accepted 
by the Finance community that considers growth and return on invested capital (thus implying 
the perceived riskiness of the firm) to be the drivers of value (Koller, Goedhart, & Wessels, 
2010). Options based models however, are not the mainstream approaches used in valuation 
due to its nature. These methods are mostly applied to value companies or investments whose 
underlying assets are quickly valued by capital markets such as commodities that require a 
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totally different risk treatment from the cash flow restatements (such methods are notably 
used to value oil reserves for example), (Froot & Kester, 1995). 
As stated before, literature on valuation is extremely complete and continues on lengthening. 
One of the conclusions of this valuation overview is that there is no unique conclusion 
regarding the way one can conduct a valuation, except, that there is no exclusive method or 
path in valuation. Literature seems to be consistent with the idea that one should adapt its 
valuation methods to his constraints and needs. With this in mind, even if the Cash Flow 
Discounting method prevails to be the mainstream approach to be studied by scholars, if there 
is one thing authors would agree on is that when performing an evaluation one should 
consider the type of company, transaction, the industry he is looking to value, the information 
available, and the purpose he wants to emphasize. For this reason, the literature review will 
highlight from this paragraph on, some of the Cash Flow Discounting variants and multiples 
analysis more relevant in a context of M&A in the Consumer Staples sector. 
2.1.2.1 Cash Flow Discounting 
Discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis, the widely recognized methodology for valuing 
companies, assets or projects has its origin in the notion of time value of money. All 
discounted cash flow methods involve forecasting future cash flows and then discounting 
them to their present value at a rate that reflects their riskiness, that is to say, the investors’ 
opportunity cost of taking that investment (Luehrman, 2007). However, DCF itself can be split 
into a variety of different approaches having all of them the same fundamental concept.  
The most common DCF approach in the literature is the Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
(WACC) approach in which the expected future cash flows are discounted at a risk adjusted 
discount rate (cost of capital) to compute the present value (PV) of that stream of cash-flows. 
For equity valuation methods, the cost of capital will purely be the cost of equity which is also 
employed when using the Adjusted Present Value (APV) approach, first investigated by 
Modigliani & Miller (1963), presented in its contemporary appearance by Myers (1974), and 
argued to be the best valuation tool in today’s technological era by Luehrman (1997). APV 
mechanics starts by considering the company as unlevered, when discounting the future cash 
flows, and then compute the PV of financial maneuvers separately and add both values. There 
has been a rising debate on the literature about which tool is better for valuing operations, the 
WACC based DCF or the APV, which will be discussed further on. 
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2.1.2.1.1 DDM and Free Cash Flow Approach –  Equity and Firm specific 
The mainstream DCF model can either be applied to value a business as a whole (Free Cash 
Flow to the Firm - FCFF) or to value the firm to the shareholders (Free Cash Flow to Equity - 
FCFE), which is to say the cash available to shareholders after funding capital requirements, 
working capital needs, but also, debt financing requirements (Stowe, Robinson, Pinto, & 
McLeavey, 2007). 
This second approach has, according to the literature, its roots in the work of Williams (1938) 
and Durand (1957) who found evidence of a close correlation between the stock price and the 
present value of the dividend stream. This correlation is the basis of another method 
frequently referred by Finance scholars, the Dividend Discount Model (DDM). As Stowe et al. 
put it in its 2007 CFA Institute scholar book “Equity Asset Valuation”, “DDM is the simplest and 
oldest present value approach to valuing stock”. Although, one of the most popular methods 
used in valuation, a significant number of authors have argued and provided evidence against 
the link between prices and dividends. Shiller (1981) has demonstrated how stock price 
volatility clearly surpasses that of dividends while Fama & French (1988) have similarly 
provided evidence that dividend yields1 fluctuate, on average, a lot more than dividends. 
Furthermore, in cash flow discounting approaches as the ones just mentioned - FCFF, FCFE and 
DDM - the first step required is to estimate what the assets will generate in the future, which 
involves creating expectations about return on invested capital (ROIC), growth rate (g) and 
growth period. Moreover, in the DDM method, assumptions must be made about growth rates 
of earnings and pay-out ratios in order to determine the long term growth rate (g) of 
dividends. The pay-out ratio is assumed to be stable (Gordon, 1962), but as Damodaran (1994) 
points out “The focus on dividends in this model can lead to skewed estimates of value for 
firms that are not paying out what they can afford in dividends. In particular, we will under 
estimate the value of firms that accumulate cash and pay out too little in dividends.”. This 
assessment can be of special importance for growing companies that usually pay lower 
dividends relative to earnings than mature ones, because reinvestment needs are higher for a 
startup. Even multi-stage growth models like that of Fuller & Hsia (1984) engage on the same 
risk as they also assume a constant pay-out ratio. 
The common alternative to DDM will be the FCFE that as Vernimmen et al. (2005) classified, is 
a direct method, through which one can directly value the equity capital, as opposed to the 





David Boquinhas Page 12 
 
FCFF in which first, it is calculated the value of the firm as a whole (the enterprise value, EV), 
and then subtract the value of net debt. 
Given this, the Free Cash Flow Valuation inputs, including both FCFF and FCFE, will continue to 
be further analyzed in this section as literature coverage of the DDM method will not be the 
focus of the rest of the review. 
 2.1.2.1.2 Free Cash Flow Inputs  
As already mentioned before, the Free Cash Flow models estimate the value of the firm, or 
equity of the firm, as the present value of future Free Cash Flows discounted at a rate that 
reflect their cost (cost of capital for FCFF (WACC), or just the cost of equity (KE) for FCFE since 
this method is only measuring how much cash a firm can afford to return to its stockholders) 
(Stowe, Robinson, Pinto, & McLeavey, 2007): 













Free cash flows, period of estimation and Terminal Value 
The definition of FCFF is generally regarded as the cash flow available to the company’s 
suppliers of capital after all operating expenses (including taxes) have been paid and necessary 
investments in working capital (e.g., inventory) and fixed capital (e.g., equipment) have been 
made. The company’s suppliers of capital include common stockholders, bondholders and 
preferred stockholders (Stowe, Robinson, Pinto, & McLeavey, 2007). FCFE is, as already 
mentioned, the cash flow available to the company’s shareholders after funding capital 
requirements, working capital needs, but also, debt interest and principal payments have been 
made (but, plus receipts from debtholders) (Stowe, Robinson, Pinto & McLeavey, 2007). FCFF 
and FCFE are advantageous relative to other earnings measures such as net income, EBIT or 
EBITDA, in the sense that these measures can either double-count or omit cash flows in some 
way.  
Given the definition of FCFs, a consensual topic in the literature, one must then define a period 
of estimation which, on the other hand, is not a subject that gathers agreement amongst 
scholars and practitioners. The formulas above (for Firm Value and Equity Value) are depicted 
as if the company would generate cash-flows for an indefinite time, which is one of the 
assumptions of the model, however it would not be possible to discount infinite cash-flows. 
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Fernandez (2007) clearly illustrates that there should exist two distinct periods of time within 
the DCF method: the explicit forecast horizon, where cash-flows are distinctively estimated 
and the post-horizon period, or Terminal Value, where cash-flows are assumed to grow at a 
steady rate in perpetuity (Gordon Model). The fact that the explicit period is usually between 5 
to 15 years, commonly being 10 years (Jennergren, 2008), contributes for the Terminal Value 
to generally represent well over 75% of the market value estimate (Young et al. 1999). 
Conversely, the assumption of constant growth in perpetuity, widely accepted in the 
computation of the Terminal Value, generated a long debate in literature regarding the 
verisimilitude of such assumption. Authors like Ohlson & Zhan (1999) analyzed how a horizon 
date affected valuation, and concluded that errors arising because of the horizon tend to 
vanish as the horizon approaches infinity and, in fact, every increase in the horizon reduces the 
error. 
Cost of Capital 
In order to compute the weighted average of the after-tax costs of different sources of capital 
(WACC) one needs estimates for the relative amount of Debt and Equity in the capital 
structure (Luehrman, 1997): 
WACC           (WE × KE) + [(WD × KD × (1 – Tax rate)] 
WE and WD stand for weight of market value of equity and weight of market value of debt in 
terms of total capital in market values, respectively. It is considered more appropriate to use 
market values since the WACC is a forward-looking measure that reflects the expectations of 
investors and how a company can raise new capital (Damodaran, 2012). 
The cost of Debt (KD) is observable in the market, and for the computation of cost of capital 
one must take into account the tax deductibility of Debt (Damodaran, 2002). Nonetheless, a 
company can have all sorts of debt obligations making it difficult to get to a precise rate, thus 
Damodaran (2012) suggests that the cost of debt can be determined by adding to the risk-free 
rate, a default spread that reflects the default risk of the company. 
Now, regarding the cost of Equity (KE), or also known as the required rate of return on 
common stock, literature has long been showing a different enthusiasm about this discount 
rate. The required rate of return for investors in the equity market has been enlightened by 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) which was first introduced by Sharpe (1964), Lintner 
(1965), Mossin (1966), and Treynor (1965). It is a one period model which affirms that in 
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equilibrium, the expected return of any asset or portfolio varies linearly with its covariance 
with the market portfolio.  
CAPM Model          𝐸 𝑟𝑖 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖 𝐸 𝑟𝑚 −  𝑟𝑓                𝛽𝑖 =
𝐶𝑜𝑣  (𝑟𝑖 ,𝑟𝑚 )
𝑉𝑎𝑟  (𝑟𝑚 )
 
 
From the above regression, it is assumed that the risk premium [𝐸 𝑟𝑚  −  𝑟𝑓] of an asset 
depends on the betas, which represent an individual asset’s correlation with a market 
portfolio. From an investor’s perspective, if the market was to be in equilibrium, he could in 
fact expect that the return he would get from a stock would only have the market risk as a 
source, the systematic risk. In this situation, he would be able to diversify the specific stock risk 
away. CAPM is in fact a very popular model to determine a theoretically appropriate rate of 
return of an asset, due to its simplicity. But aligned to this, it is also a much criticized model. 
Roll (1977) for instance has stated that the market portfolio in which the excess asset returns 
are regressed is only a proxy of the true market; therefore it might seem to be mean-variance 
efficient when the true market is not. Also the proxy may not be efficient, leading to an 
inconsistent 𝛽 estimate.  
Other authors have grant valuation literature with alternatives to the CAPM. Fama-French 
(1992) Three-Factor model, for instance, provides an alternative to the CAPM, and tries to 
explain the CAPM anomalies. In their model, apart from the excess market return, two 
additional factors are included in the effort of explaining an asset’s excess return. These are 
the return on a portfolio of small stocks minus the return on a portfolio of large stocks (SMB), 
and the return on a portfolio of stocks with high book to market values minus the return on a 
portfolio of stocks with low book to market values (HML) which are important for describing 
the returns on growth-stock funds. 
 
Three-Factor Model      𝐸 𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑓 =  + 𝛽1𝑖 𝐸 𝑟𝑚  −  𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽3𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝑒𝑖  
The debate about the computation of the equity discount rate has still many pages to go. 
However, it seems that CAPM continues to be the most popular asset pricing model among the 
Finance community with several studies proving the effectiveness of CAPM against the Fama-
French Model. One of those studies was led by Kaplan & Ruback (1996) who examined 51 
highly leveraged transactions and looked for the relationship of the implied risk premia not 
only to systematic risk measures, but also to firm size and book-to-market ratios, concluding 
that the implied risk premia were not significantly related to firm size or pre-transaction book-
to-market ratios, but were positively related to firm and industry betas. 
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Regarding the estimation of Beta for the CAPM, a relative measure of systematic risk (Koller, 
Goedhart & Wessels, 2010), one must understand its drawbacks and criticisms. The first 
drawback is that there is no entire market portfolio of all equities available to easily assess 
beta. For this reason, practitioners use a proxy of the market, usually a broad stock market 
index such as the S&P 500. Moreover, the estimation of beta can follow a number of methods 
illustrated in the literature by several authors: 
 Raw Beta – probably the most common, and suggested by several authors such as 
Damodaran (2012), it is computed by running a simple regression with the company’s 
monthly excess stock returns as the dependent variable and the monthly excess 
returns in the market as the independent variable (Hitchner, 2006); 
 Unlevered (𝛽𝑈) and Levered Beta (𝛽𝐿) – 𝛽𝐿 = 𝛽𝑈  × [1 + (1 - 𝑇𝑐 )( 
𝐷2
𝐸
)] – knowing that the 
unlevered beta removes a company’s financing decision from the beta calculation 
(Hitchner, 2006); 
 Adjusted Betas – suggested by Vasicek (1973), the adjusted beta is a weighted average 
of the company’s regression beta and its peer group beta, based on the theory that 
over time a company’s beta tends toward its industry’s average beta. The motivation 
behind this calculation is to make a forecast of the true beta in the future which can be 
used to estimate the expected return.  
 Industry Betas – the “Full-Information” (FIB) approach, first suggested by Ehrhardt & 
Bhagwat (1991), estimates industry betas by using a cross-sectional regression that 
includes from all companies, the betas and their percentage of sales in all of the 
industries. Ehrhardt & Bhagwat (1991) performed the regression using OLS, so their 
industry betas were equally weighted across companies. Kaplan & Peterson (1998) 
however, obtained market capitalization-weighted industry betas by developing a 
capitalization-weighted regression technique.  The FIB approach according to Kaplan & 
Peterson (1998) seems to be gaining more relevance in the literature than Ehrhardt & 
Bhagwat’s one. 
 Peer Group Beta – “it takes into consideration the industry betas of all industries in 
which a company is involved. It is the sales-weighted average of the betas for each 
industry in which a company has sales.” (Hitchner, 2006). 
 
                                                             
2 Book Debt 
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Now, the risk free rate affects both the cost of equity and the cost of debt, but it is normally 
given little attention in academic research. According to Pratt & Grabowski (2010), the risk-
free rate should reflect three components (a real return for lending the funds over the 
investment period, thus forgoing consumption for which the funds otherwise could be used; 
expected rate of inflation during the period of the investment; and the risk that the 
investment’s principal market value will rise or fall during the period to maturity as a function 
of changes in the general level of interest rates). All three of these economic factors are 
embedded in the yield to maturity for any given maturity length. Damodaran (2008) classifies 
an asset as risk-free when its actual return equals the expected return and there is no 
uncertainty or variance related to its actual return. The author also suggests that the risk-free 
rate should be consistent with the currency and duration of the cash-flows under analysis. 
Practitioners frequently use ten-year government bonds, even for companies with higher cash-
flow duration, given the lack of liquidity of longer-maturity instruments. 
Finally, the risk premium [𝐸 𝑟𝑚  −  𝑟𝑓], last component of the CAPM, quantifies the return of 
the market over risk-free assets. Risk premium is commonly computed by recurring to 
historical averages and forward-looking estimates (Koller, Goedhart & Wessels, 2010). 
Nevertheless, other methods to estimate the market risk premium include the use of 
regression analysis to link current market variables (i.e. dividend-to-price ratio) to project the 
expected market risk premium and, the use of DCF valuation, along with estimates of return 
on investment and growth, to reverse engineer the market’s cost of capital (Koller, Goedhart & 
Wessels, 2010). While arguments about the methods to estimate the risk premium are 
common in academic Finance literature, other arguments concerning the risk premium 
computation are also present in the literature disregarding the method used. One of the 
disagreements lies on the fact that analysts often add a premium to account for the country 
risk in some markets while literature argues that the country risk, like the specific risk, can be 
diversified away if the investor holds a geographically diversified portfolio (Stulz, 1999). 
Goedhart & Haden (2003) on the other hand, advocate that this is a subjective matter and that 
on a short term valuation it may make sense to add a country risk while on a long term analysis 
its effect would not be relevant. 
Numerous studies on the CAPM have been published addressing and modifying the original 
CAPM. Most recently, Bali et al. (2009) examined the cross-sectional relationship between 
conditional betas and expected stock returns for a sample period from 1963 to 2004. The 
authors found that it explained between 2.02 percent and 2.13 percent of the cross-sectional 
variation in returns. Addition of size and book-to-market ratio increased the R2 values to 
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between 4.7 percent and 4.87 percent. No matter how negatively this low explanatory power 
can be viewed by the Finance world, one must take into account that markets are not perfect 
and a stock’s return cannot be predicted relying 100% on explainable variables. If both CAPM 
and Three-Factor Model were to work out perfectly, this would mean they would have a zero 
alpha, the alpha is the stock’s specific risk, therefore what is not explained by the market.  
APV vs. WACC 
The Adjusted Present Value is an alternative approach to the WACC method in which financial 
maneuvers, including interest tax shields, costs of financial distress (include direct costs such 
as lawyers expenses, and indirect costs such as loss of clients and brand damage), subsidies, 
etc… are separately valued and added to the base-case valued (value of the project as if it 
were financed entirely with equity) (Luehrman, 1997). This approach is argued to better value 
a business when its capital structure is complex and financial side effects are not reliably 
addressed by the automatic WACC method (Koller, Goedhart & Wessels, 2010). The APV 
method is also advocated to provide a more complete picture and help managers perceive not 
only the value of an asset but where the value comes from (Damodaran, 2006). The main 
argument defended by Luehrman (1997) is that the APV is still a DCF methodology and some 
of the limitations that the WACC approach demonstrates (poorly suited to value projects that 
are essentially options), are also present in the APV, however some of them are not (“*…+ APV 
always works when WACC does, and sometimes when WACC doesn’t, because it requires 
fewer restrictive assumption *…+). In addition, Luehrman (1997) states that the fact that WACC 
can still be more popular than APV is due to the fact that WACC’s virtue, only one discounting 
operation, was a great advantage in the days of “calculators and slide rules”, but nowadays it 
has become irrelevant. 
When using APV though new concerns arise: which discount rate to use when discounting 
interest tax shields for instance? Authors like Myers (1974) defended the use of the cost of 
debt to discount tax shields, years later however, Miles & Ezzel (1980) and Harris & Pringle 
(1985) advocated the use of the cost of equity as the discount rate. More recently, Luehrman 
(1997) assumes that academics do not agree on how risky tax shields are. The author defends 
that tax shields are as uncertain as principal and interest payments, yet “*…+ there may come a 
time when you can afford to make your interest payments but can’t use the tax shields *…+”. 
For this reason, Luehrman (1997) suggest that tax shields are riskier than Debt and should be 
discounted at a higher rate than Debt, nonetheless, the author fails at quantifying how much 
higher the discount rate should be. 
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Despite all different views in the literature regarding the discount rates used to value the PV of 
financial side effects and the efficiency of using one approach over the other, one argument of 
the APV advocators seems to gather consensus amidst the academics: “Rather than model the 
effect of capital structure changes in the weighted average cost of capital, APV explicitly 
measures and values the cash flow effects of financing separately.” (Koller, Goedhart & 
Wessels, 2010). 
To sum up, cash flow discounting analysis have a variety of alternatives that have drawn the 
attention of more and more academics due to its relevance in practical Finance. There are 
many debatable subjects regarding DCF analysis which in turn is fueling scholars to better 
complement the initial studies carried by academics, and it seems this dynamic literature is 
here to stay. 
2.1.2.2 Relative Valuation 
As already stated in the commencement of this overview, there is the idea that cash flow 
discounting methods are usually applied by academics while in the “real world” analysts 
typically resort to relative valuation to price securities, transactions or other financial assets. In 
fact, the use of relative valuation – comparing a firm’s multiples with those of comparable 
companies (Koller, Goedhart & Wessels, 2010) – is widespread and most equity research 
reports and valuations are based upon the use of some multiple. The fact this method gathers 
so much popularity among analysts does not comes as a surprise once one understands the 
advantages of multiples valuation in regard to other valuation methodologies. Damodaran 
(2002) enumerates some of the reasons of such a success:  
 Fewer assumptions are needed, and far quicker than DCF valuation; 
 Simpler to use and to present to clients and investors than DCF; 
 More likely to reliably represent the market’s direction. 
Even so, the use of multiples in valuation must be carefully and properly executed. When 
performing a valuation using multiples one must bear in mind that all companies are different 
from each other, and that “any analysis is as accurate as the forecasts it relies on”. Koller, 
Goedhart & Wessels (2010) refer that multiples are often misunderstood and misapplied by 
overlooking well-known facts. The authors exemplify with the use of the multiple P/E (price-to-
earnings) where analysts commonly multiply the industry average P/E by a company’s earnings 
to obtain a fair price estimate, and thus totally overlooking the fact that companies within an 
industry can have very different expected growth rates, returns on invested capital, and capital 
structures. Koller et al. (2010) conclude that a carefully designed multiples analysis can be of 
David Boquinhas Page 19 
 
great value, in accordance with Kaplan & Ruback (1996) who recommends using both DCF and 
multiples approaches in practical valuation where comparable values are available. Kaplan & 
Ruback (1996) empirical study also contributes to the literature by suggesting that one should 
use multiples based on EBITDA to make the values estimated with multiples comparable to 
those estimated using cash-flow discounting.  
In order to compare the values of similar firms in the market, Damodaran (2002) standardized 
values as follows: 
 Earnings multiples – the value of the firm as a multiple of the operating income or 
EBITDA for instance; 
 Book value or Replacement value multiples – the value of the firm as a multiple of the 
book value of all assets, or as an alternative, the replacement cost of the assets 
(Tobin’s Q); 
 Revenue multiples – far less accounting influence, the value of the firm as a multiple of 
revenues such as sales; 
 Sector-Specific multiples – the value of the firm as a multiple of some sector-specific 
characteristic (i.e., number of hits generated by a firm’s website in the Internet sector). 
Koller et al. (2010) advocate the use of forward-looking multiples to be consistent with the 
principals of valuation (PV of future cash-flows), the use of Enterprise-Value multiples 
(EV/EBIT) to avoid price-earnings major flaws (effect of capital structure, the effect of non-
operating gains and losses and manipulation via depreciations) and the adjustment of 
Enterprise-Value multiples because even though EBIT is superior to earnings for multiples 
calculation purposes, it still needs to be adjusted for non-operating items (excess cash and 
other non-operating assets, operating leases, employee stock options, pension liabilities). On 
the other hand, Liu, Nissim & Thomas (2007) support the higher accuracy of earnings multiples 
over any other multiples based on their empirical analysis. 
Although there is no general agreement on which multiples are better fit at providing a reliable 
relative valuation, literature seems to agree on the role multiples analysis play in valuation – a 
useful and relatively simple methodology that when cautiously applied can be very consistent 
and a great ally of the DCF models. 
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2.2 M&A Overview 
Mergers, and acquisitions, of firms have always been a natural strategy used by businesses 
with the intent to grow, prosper and deliver value for its investors and customers. The concept 
of creating alliances between similar entities that will result in a stronger entity that benefits 
all of the intervenient, or, the integration of a smaller entity in a bigger one with that same 
purpose – to strengthen both entities – is not new, it is in fact ancient and it has been part of 
every dimension of life. However, this natural concept is nonetheless one of the most 
important shapers of evolution, with its decisions dictating many times the route development 
will take. In the global era the world lives nowadays, the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) of 
businesses has been, and will continue to, be a shaper of the global economy’s future. 
Identically to literature on valuation, literature on M&A is immense and some of its topics are 
far from scholars and analysts’ consensus. The fact that deals like M&A are an inherently way 
for businesses to expand in an incessantly globalized world, in addition to the foggy 
assessment  of such deals’ outcomes, have provided Finance scholars with many resources to 
write. To further understand the role played by M&A transactions a look into its main 
characteristics and history shall be conducted.  
2.2.1 Types of Deals 
Literature distinguishes Mergers and Acquisitions transactions into several types of deals. 
Damodaran (2002) points out the difference between a firm’s acquisition led by another firm 
or by its own managers or outside investors (usually a tender offer). The latter are named 
management buyouts (managers’ involvement) or leveraged buyouts when the funds for the 
tender offer are mainly composed by Debt. As for an acquisition led by another firm, the 
author classifies into four different categories: merger, when two firms agree to combine, 
usually 50% of both firms’ shareholders have to agree to the merger, and the target firm 
ceases to exist and becomes part of the acquiring company; consolidation, when a new firm is 
created after a merger and the shareholders from both firms receive a stake in the new 
company’s common equity capital; tender offer, when one firm makes an offer for the 
outstanding stock of another firm at a specific price directly to the shareholders of the 
company, thus enabling the target firm to continue existing as long as there are dissident 
stockholders; and finally, acquisition of assets, when one firm purchases the assets of another 
company conditional on its shareholders’ approval. 
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2.2.2 History and Patterns 
One of the major features of M&A present in the literature is its “wave pattern”. Martynova & 
Renneboog (2009) classified the term “takeover wave” as the pattern of the number and total 
value of takeover deals over time. This phenomenon means that there are short periods of 
very intense merger activity (Town, 1992). Martynova & Renneboog (2009) states that five 
completed waves have been examined in the academic literature – early 1900’s, 1920’s, 
1960’s, 1980’s and the 1990’s – being the most recent particularly remarkable in terms of size 
and geographical dispersion. The author’s study argued that M&A activity is: (a) typically 
interrupted by an abrupt decline in stock markets and a subsequent economic recession; (b) 
usually takes place in periods of economic recovery coinciding with rapid credit expansion and 
stock market booms; (c) often fuelled by regulatory changes; (d) frequently driven by industrial 
and technological shocks; and (e) significantly influenced by managers’ personal objectives.  
Accordingly, another main literature concern is whether M&A deals have been having the 
desired profitable effect throughout history. Gaughan (2004) stated that many of the largest 
deals in the 90’s M&A wave were “colossal failures”. The author claims that “some of the more 
prominent failures of the 1990s, such as the AOL Time Warner (now Time Warner) fiasco, the 
Daimler-Chrysler merger, the acquisition programs of Tyco and WorldCom, and Vivendi’s and 
AT&T’s unsuccessful forays into fields outside of their core businesses” can all be traced to 
insufficiently diligent board of directors. This fact lead to a recurrent issue in M&A texts: 
whether the focus of M&A activity should be a diversified or a related acquisition strategy. 
Authors like Morck et al. (1990) have suggested that managers’ motivation to engage on 
diversified acquisitions is to make up for poor performance, reduce risk and assure survival of 
the company. The authors, in agreement with Gaughan (2004), assert that few companies 
have been able to successfully pursue a diversification strategy. Other authors like Berger & 
Ofek (1995), Maquieira, Megginson & Nail (1998) and DeLong (2001) also found evidence of 
value destruction from diversification and that the degree of relatedness between the 
businesses and geographical location of the acquirer and acquiring company are positively 
correlated with returns. However, Morck & Yeung (1997) found that not all companies are 
subject to value destruction from diversification and that information-intensive (e.g. R&D) 
companies, can benefit from this strategy. 
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2.2.3 Synergies and value creation 
Damodaran (2005) defines synergy as the additional value produced by two combining firms 
that together create opportunities that would not otherwise been created. Synergies are the 
‘Holy Grail’ of mergers and acquisitions and as just mentioned above, M&A deals can easily 
destroy value and turn out to be authentic failures. For that reason, the interest academics 
nurture for the creation of synergies and its measurement is significant. Synergies are created 
from different sources which Damodaran (2005) categorized as operating and financial 
synergies.  Operating synergies relate to the operations of the post-transaction firm and 
include economies of scale, increased pricing power and higher growth potential (higher 
expected cash flows). Financial synergies include tax benefits, diversification, higher debt 
capacity and uses for excess cash (higher expected cash flows and/or lower discount rates). 
Synergies however need to be valued prior to the deal has occurred leading one more time to 
projections and expectations. That is where the “fog” is. As Warren Buffett once said, “In some 
mergers there truly are major synergies – though often times the acquirer pays too much to 
obtain them – but at other times the cost and revenue benefits that are projected prove 
illusory”. Damodaran (2005) stresses how important it is to keep the value of the synergy apart 
from the value of control, when valuing the synergies (in which according to the authors’ steps 
one should firstly value the firms involved in the merger independently, then value the 
combined firm, with no synergy and finally, value the combined firm with synergy). In a 
summarized way, to value control, Damodaran (2005) suggests a revaluation of the target firm 
with a presumably better management in place and then to compare the value obtained with 
the valuation with the existing management in place. 
As Sirower & Sahni (2006) argue, the truth of the matter is that literature agreement that, on 
average, acquiring companies increase value and acquirer’s destroy value for their 
shareholders, has little or no impact on the course M&A activity will take on the future. The 
good boards and managers will always go for a deal when they spot a good opportunity, 
whether it will materialize or not. A study on synergies that can relate to this view, and can 
provide an explanation for the creation or destruction of value within M&A related companies 
was conducted by Houston et al. (2001) where the authors suggest that expected synergies are 
important drivers of the wealth creation through M&A. By studying the relationship of the 
present value of the synergies with the deal’s announcement day, Houston et al. (2001) have 
found evidence that the market discount the value of synergies associated with the deal with a 
greater discount rate for revenue-enhancing synergies, and with a smaller discount rate for 
cost-reduction synergies, thus influencing the actual wealth creation of the transaction.  
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2.2.4 Performance fundamentals of M&A 
Sirower & Sahni (2006) examined a sample of 302 large deals from the 90’s merger wave with 
the purpose of effectively oversight the decisions that lie behind years of difficulty in creating 
value through M&A. The key results of the study are as follows: 
 “On average, acquirers underperform their industry peers.” Note, however, that 
together with this average there was a wide variance of outcomes in the sample with 
one-year returns ranging from -151% to 281.5%; 
 “Initial reactions are persistent and indicative of future returns.” The authors affirm 
that the majority of deals that had an initial negative response presented negative 
returns one year after the deal, while half of the deals that began positively 
maintained a strong positive return after the same period; 
 “Delivering results after a good start pays off big.” Following last argument, the 
authors conclude that deals that began with a positive reaction by investors, and that 
continued to receive a positive response outperformed in 58% deals that began and 
continued to be perceived negatively; 
 “Price matters.” The study conducted by the two authors found that the average 
premium paid by the initially negative responded deals was around 8% higher than the 
positive deals. The deals performing negatively, after one year, had around the same 
difference in premium paid and, more prominent was the difference found in the 
premium paid between persistent negative performers and positive ones (around 
15%); 
 “Cash deals outperform stock deals.” This finding reiterates the extensively 
documented evidence on the underperformance of stock deals; 
 “Sellers are the biggest beneficiaries of M&A transactions.” Shareholders of the buyer 
company lost on average, while shareholders of the selling firm earned on average 
20% from the week before the deal announcement and the week after; 
 “M&A transactions create value at the macroeconomic level.” The combined value 
creation (even though shareholders of the buyer company loses, shareholders of the 
selling firm win) was on average 1% at announcement, thus creating value for the 
economy. The stock deals however presented negative combined value creation, but 
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on the other hand cash deals had a positive combined return compensating for the 
observed value destruction of stock deals. 
2.2.5 Cross Border M&A. New wave? More value?  
Zenner, Matthews, Marks & Mago (2008) studied how the growing integration of the global 
markets for labor, capital, goods, and services has been fueling cross-border M&A in a 
stagnated developed economy. The authors refer how in 2007 cross-border transaction 
quintupled in dollar volume, attaining an historical high volume. Zenner, Matthews, Marks & 
Mago (2008) identify and focus on globalization, diversification and deregulation as the long-
term factors driving the current cross-border M&A wave while the short-term catalysts are 
recognized to be the high relative valuations, cheap USD, sovereign wealth funds influence and 
reduced domestic competitions. 
Dobbs, Goedhart & Suonio (2006), in a previous study, had already studied the new boom in 
M&A activity circa 2006. Their study did not impact on whether the activity was taking place 
across borders or inside border, but on how shareholders were doing compared to the 
previous waves researched in the literature. According to the researchers, the value added by 
the deals in the current boom was around 6% when the average value creation in the previous 
boom was a bit more than 1%.  The authors mention the fact that the value creation through 
M&A is at a ten-year record high. One of the explanations presented by the authors for the 
more favorable market reactions is the fact that the percentage of cash-deals to total deals has 
increased in this boom. However, researchers note that both cash and stock deals performed 
best in the current boom. Another shift in performance observed by the authors is the value 
acquiring companies’ shareholders are getting from this current boom in M&A activity. 
Accordingly, Dobbs, Goedhart & Suonio (2006) argue that buyer’s firms’ shareholders are 
keeping more value and that the proportion of acquirers overpaying has decreased. Both the 
lower premiums paid and also the proportion of cash deals are indicated as plausible 
justifications for the observed acquirer firms’ shareholders’ gains. 
Conclusion 
Both Valuation and M&A are extensively researched subjects by academics. The fact that 
valuation is the basis of Finance these days, and M&A activity plays such an important role at 
micro and macroeconomic levels have made it this way. Valuation literature keeps on growing 
with the conscience that the models applied do not truly reflect reality. Academics desire to 
improve these models while dealing with the paradox between complexity and reality-faithful 
models have kept literature on valuation dynamic. M&A activity patterns and its much debated 
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value creation/destruction phenomenon have also kept scholars very interested in this topic 
with the intention of deciphering the secrets of a successfully transaction. A glance on some of 
the work conducted by scholars and academics over the years was provided in this section 
with the purpose of illustrating how researchers have been approaching both Valuation and 
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3. Companies and Industry 
This paper presents a hypothetical merger between Beam Inc. (US) and Pernod Ricard S.A. 
(French), two companies operating in the Distilled Beverage (also known as Wines & Spirits, 
liquors or distillers & vintners) industry. 
This section provides an overview on the Wines & Spirits industry worldwide, followed by 
separately analysis on both Beam Inc. (Beam) and Pernod Ricard S.A. (Pernod Ricard). The 
purpose of such analysis is to contextualize the proposed deal within the macro and micro 
environment in which the participant companies are involved, to identify trends, specific 
characteristics, and value drivers that can influence the way the merger should be structured.  
3.1 Alcoholic Beverage Industry 
The industry in which both Beam and Pernod Ricard operate is classified according to the GICS 
(MSCI 2010) as Distillers & Vintners. The GICS (MSCI 2010) classifies the Distillers & Vintners 
sub-industry of Food, Beverage & Tobacco, as the distillers, vintners and producers of alcoholic 
beverages that are not classified in the Brewers sub-industry which in turn include the 
producers of beers and malt liquors (high alcohol content beer).  
The Distillers & Vintners industry can be sub-divided into two main industries: spirits and wine 
industries. However, companies in the Wines & Spirits industry compete for market share in an 
exceptionally competitive environment. Competition within this industry is not only between 
brands but also between categories and includes other alcoholic beverages such as beer. 
Products like Heineken beer competes not only against Budweiser beer, but also against 
Ballantine’s scotch or Bacardi rum (ICAP, 2002). Under this circumstances, this industry 
overview section will not be confined to the analysis of the specific Distillers & Vintners 
industry category but will, on the other hand, highlight the main characteristics of the whole 
alcoholic beverage sector that can play a determinant role in the assessment of the context in 
which the merger between Beam and Pernod Ricard will eventually take place, with a special 
emphasis on the US market, in which most of the pre-determinants and outcomes of the deal 
will have an effect. 
Competition and major players  
Alcoholic beverages include beer, cider, ale, wine (including sparkling, barley, and rice wine) 
and spirits such as rum, whiskey, brandy and vodka. In 2011, almost 40% of the world’s 
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alcoholic beverage consumption involves branded drinks that are usually large companies 
operating at an international level and investing heavily in marketing to promote image and 
encourage consumer loyalty (ReportLinker, 2011). This happens because demand is driven by 
consumer preferences in alcohol consumption and demographic trends. The profitability of 
individual companies depends on effective sales operations and maintaining low operating 
costs. Large companies have advantages in exclusive distribution rights in large markets. Small 
operations can compete effectively by distributing rare and expensive products. At a general 
level, the world’s top five alcohol beverage companies (thus including wine, spirits and beer 
players) are, according to its market cap, as listed below: 
 Figure 1: Top Five Alcohol Beverage Companies by Market Cap 
Rank Company Country Market Cap ($ M) 
1 Anheuser-Busch Inbev Belgium 155,675.75 
2 AMBEV Brazil 122,635.46 
3 Diageo UK 75,527.39 
4 Heineken Netherlands 41,727.84 
5 Pernod Ricard France 32,100.63 
             Source: Bloomberg (17-April-2013) 
Notice that, of these five, only Diageo and Pernod Ricard are major players in the wine and 
spirits industry. 
The beer wholesale industry is fragmented: the top 50 companies account for about a third of 
industry revenue. The wine market is also very fragmented. The top 10 companies accounted 
for just 13.5% of total sales by volume in 2010. The largest player in the wine industry is 
Constellation Brands, which has a 3% market share. The spirits industry, in contrast with the 
beer and wine industry is characterized by a high degree of concentration, with major US 
players Diageo, Brown Foreman, Beam and Pernod Ricard accounting for much of domestic 
production. The top players often buy and sell brands among each other, thus leading to 
considerable reallocation of market share and brands. For instance, in 2008, Fortune Brands 
acquired the Cruzan Rum brand from Pernod Ricard and later in that year sold Pernod Ricard 
its Absolut vodka brand. Even though it is difficult to indicate exactly the market share of the 
major players operating in the spirits industry, the top five spirits’ players in the world by 
volume are, according to an ImpactBank study in 2011, as follows: 
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Figure 2: Top Five Distilled Spirit Marketers Worldwide in 2010 (millions of nine-liter cases) 
Rank Company 2010 Volume 1995 Volume 1995 Rank 
1 Diageo 115.9 109.0 1 
2 United Spirits 110.7 15.1 9 
3 Pernod Ricard 97.0 24.4 7 
4 Bacardi 36.4 27.4 5 
5 Beam 33.5 24.7 6 
         Source: ImpactBank, 2011 
Growth and key segments in the Distillers & Vintners Industry  
“While consolidation has been these companies’ long-term M&A strategy, players have 
recently tweaked their approach in order to lessen the impact of the recession. Their discount 
brands have been selling well. However, this segment is very competitive with a number of 
unbranded and private label wines available in many markets.” (M&A International, 2011). As 
a result, global alcoholic beverage companies like Pernod Ricard, its main competitors (e.g. 
Diageo, Bacardi), and major wine producers such as Constellation Brands have recently 
experienced margin degradation. In order to counteract this, producers have begun to divest 
their lower-end offerings to focus on premium brands, i.e. over $12/liter (M&A International, 
2011).  
There is indeed the perception that the wine market can lose ground to alternatives such as 
beer and spirits, especially as consumptions trends change, however, the global wine industry 
is expected to generate almost $292 billion in 2014. The EU leads with a 75% share of the 
global market (ReportLinker, 2011). On the other hand, the global spirits industry was worth 
almost $263 billion in 2010, having recorded yearly growth of over 2.5% between 2006 and 
2010 (ReportLinker, 2011). Market growth is expected to accelerate to exceed a yearly growth 
rate of 3% between 2010 and 2015 to hit $306 billion (ReportLinker, 2011). The global spirits 
industry refers to the manufacturing of spirits, with companies involved in distilling and 
blending liquors, blending and mixing liquors with other ingredients, and distilling potable 
liquors. Worldwide, in 2012, the spirits category distribution according to global volume is as 
follows: 
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                                                     Source: Distilled Spirits Council of US, 2013 
While in the US market, Vodka is the Spirits’ leader accounting for 32% of all volume and 26% 
of revenue in 2012 (Distilled Spirits Council of US, 2013), in a global level, whisky represents 
the leading market segment, generating almost $70 billion in sales in 2010 and accounting for 
almost 27% of the overall market in terms of value (ReportLinker, 2011). The vodka industry 
recorded strong global growth prior to the economic recession, which negatively impacted the 
market. Though vodka sales plummeted in 2009, the market recovered in 2010, with a 
particularly strong rebound in Russia (ReportLinker, 2011). The world gin market reached a 
volume of almost 47 million cases in 2010, with the US leading the market with almost 38% 
market share (appendix 1, 2 and 3). 
Trends in the Spirits Industry 
Among the factors contributing for the continuous growth of the spirits industry, the following 
four trends have played an important role during the 2000’s decade, with special incidence on 
the US market (Distilled Spirits Council of US, 2013): 
 Product innovations and sophisticated line extensions. For instance, in 2012 over 40% 
of products had a flavor (e.g. orange, cherry, lemon) component beyond traditional 
categories (e.g. vodka, rum, tequila); 
 “Premiumization” - Spirits’ products are segmented on supplier prices, even though 
the range varies by product category, into four classes: Value, Premium, High End, and 
Super Premium (being Value the cheapest and Super Premium the most expensive) 
(Distilled Spirits Council of US, 2013) (see Appendix 1 for the distribution by Volume 















Figure 3: Spirits Category in % of Global Volume
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Value category has grown steadily, Super Premium has skyrocketed, in a phenomenon 
named “Premiumization”; 
Figure 4: Evolution of Value Spirits vs. Super Premium Spirits 
  
Source: Distilled Spirits Council of US, 2013 
 Modernization drive expands consumer access and “premiumization”. The increased 
advertising played an important role for the modernization and “Premiumization” 
effect. The new media (e.g. Facebook, YouTube, Twitter) allows spirits, beer and wine 
to have a whole new visibility in different market segments; 
 Global fascination with American Whiskey drives 3rd year of record exports. American 
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3.2 Pernod Ricard SA 
Description 
According to Forbes (2013) description, Pernod Ricard SA is a France-based producer and 
distributor of spirits and wines. The Company is active in eight principal beverage sectors: 
whiskies, aniseed spirits, liqueurs, cognacs and brandies, white spirits and rums, bitters, 
champagnes and wines. Pernod Ricard operates through 75 affiliates and has chosen to focus 
on sustainable growth through a large portfolio of international brands and a high-end 
strategy, known as “Premiumisation”. Pernod Ricard SA's flagship brands include ABSOLUT, 
Ricard, Havana Club, Ballantine's, Malibu, The Glenlivet, Chivas Regal, Beefeater, Kahlua, 
Martell, Royal Salute, Mumm, Perrier-Jouet and Jameson, among others. The wine category 
includes, Jacob's Creek, Brancott Estate, Campo Viejo and Graffigna. It operates as holding 
company, with the structure divided between brand owner subsidiaries, such as The Absolut 
Company, Havana Club International and Chivas Brothers, which produce and develop 
marketing strategies for the brands, and regional distribution subsidiaries, such as Pernod 
Ricard Europe, Pernod Ricard Americas and Pernod Ricard Asia, distribute local brands. As of 
December 31, 2010, the Company owned 107 production plants.  
History and Strategy 
Pernod Ricard was born in 1975 out of the merger of two companies, Pernod SA and Ricard SA 
and ever since the group was able to take advantages of new resources and expand globally by 
pursuing an acquisition strategy, common to its industry peers. Pernod Ricard gave priority to 
whiskey, the most consumed spirits in the world, and the United States, the world’s biggest 
market for the industry. Following a series of successful acquisitions around the globe, in the 
late 90’s Pernod Ricard “embarked on a reorganization, aimed primarily at decentralizing its 
activities” (Pernod Ricard Annual Report, 2012). With a strong financial and commercial 
performance, Pernod refocused on its core business, starting to divest from the non-alcoholic 
food and beverage segment and continuing its acquisition strategy of major spirits companies 
as can be elucidated by the successful acquisition in 2008 of Vin&Sprit Group, owner of 
ABSOLUT Premium vodka, the world leader in its category. In late 2000’s Pernod Ricard, 
despite the difficult economic context, continued to demonstrate a rise in its profits with the 
successfully integrated ABSOLUT brand, and continued with the strategic refocusing with a 
series of disposals, particularly in the wine segment accompanying the industry trends and 
with the purpose of deleveraging its balance sheet. 
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Organization, key segments and brands 
As illustrated in Figure 5 below, the general organization of the Group is based around Pernod 
Ricard which holds companies referred to as “Brand Companies” and, either directly or 
indirectly through holding companies referred to as “Market Companies”. Some companies 
combine both Brand Company and Market Company activities as it is the case with the 
ABSOLUT brand, for which Pernod Ricard set up two new operational structures following its 
acquisition in July 2008: The ABSOLUT Company, a Brand Company responsible notably for the 
ABSOLUT brand throughout the world (including production), and Pernod Ricard Nordic, a 
“cluster”, under Pernod Ricard Europe, in charge of selling Pernod Ricard’s local and 
international brands on the Swedish, Danish, Finnish, Norwegian, Baltic and Icelandic markets 
(Pernod Ricard Annual Report, 2012). 
Figure 5: Pernod Ricard’s Organization 
 
Source: Pernod Ricard Annual Report, 2012 
The company relies on its decentralized organizational structure, which employs almost 19,000 
people in more than 70 countries, to pursue its current strategy of: (a) investing foremost on 
its world-class strategic brands (14 of those brands); (b) add Premium Brands to the company’s 
portfolio; (c) expand in the U.S. and emerging markets; and (d) continue to grow through 
acquisitions to remain a dynamic player in the consolidation of the Wines & Spirits sector. 
Regarding Pernod Ricard’s portfolio, the company owns one of the industry’s most prestigious 
brand portfolios which include the following strategic brands: 
Figure 6: Top 5 Strategic Brands3 (2011/2012 volumes in millions of 9-liter cases) 
 
Source: Pernod Ricard Annual Report, 2012 
                                                             
3 Excluding wine brands 
11,4   





ABSOLUT Ballantine's Ricard Chivas Regal Jameson
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Among the top 5 brands, ABSOLUT, Chivas Regal and Jameson have shown a positive growth 
both in volume and organic sales from 2011 to 2012, particularly Jameson with a 15% volume 
growth from one period to another while ABSOLUT and Chivas Regal have grown 3% and 7% 
respectively. Ballantine’s and Ricard’s volumes have decreased around 1% and 3%, 
correspondingly. 
In concern to region, Pernod Ricard’s net sales growth has been following different directions 
in different parts of the globe, as illustrated in figure 7, mainly due to the increasing demand of 
wines & spirits in developing countries and the successfully positioned ABSOLUT brand within 
the U.S. market which is the biggest market for the vodka category.   
Figure 7: Net Sales by Region (in millions of euros) 
 
Source: Pernod Ricard Annual Report, 2012 
Net sales (excluding duties and taxes) in Americas have grown an average of 6.3% per annum 
in the past 5 fiscal years mostly due to the acquisition of the brand ABSOLUT (vodka) and the 
continuing success of Jameson. Asia/Rest of World recorded a CAGR of 12.1% over the same 
period of time, and remains the Group’s main growth engine, especially due to Asia (in 
particular China, India, Vietnam, Taiwan and Travel Retail). Growth is also very strong in 
Africa/Middle East. The segmentation of net sales, as represented in figure 7, will be especially 
important for the valuation of Pernod Ricard as it will be conducted mainly by directing the 
identified value drivers for each geographical region instead of using the branding 
segmentation, since most of the value drivers identified in this paper can better suit 
projections for regions than brands.  
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Regarding competition in its business lines, Pernod Ricard faces competition mostly from  large 
multinationals in the Wines & Spirits segment, such as  Diageo, Bacardi-Martini, Brown-
Forman, Moët-Hennessy, Beam, Constellation Brands, Gallo, Campari and Rémy Cointreau for 
international brands and from smaller companies or producers of local brands (for example, 
UB Group in India, CEDC in Poland). 
Financial Information 
Key statistics 
Figure 8 presents an overview of the financials of Pernod Ricard’s group. Notice that Pernod 
Ricard’s fiscal year ends at the end of June, however, for comparison purposes with Beam, and 
Pernod’s competitors, the financial metrics are also presented for December of 2012. 
Figure 8: Key Financials (in Millions of Euros, except per share items) 
 12 Months  
Jun-30-2010 
12 Months  
Jun-30-2011 
12 Months  
Jun-30-2012 
12 Months  
Dec-31-2012* 
Total Revenue 7,081 7,643 8,215 8,508 
    Growth over prior period (1.7%) 7.9% 7.5% 6.7% 
Gross Profit 4,218 4,610 5,046 5,280 
     Margin % 59.6% 60.3% 61.4% 62.1% 
EBITDA 2,006 2,040 2,168 2,307 
    Margin % 26.3% 26.7% 26.4% 27.1% 
Net Income 951 1,045 1,146 1,193 
    Margin % 13.4% 13.7% 14.0% 14.0% 
Diluted EPS4 3.59 3.94 4.32 4.48 
    Growth over prior period (7.5%) 9.7% 9.6% 0.6% 
Source: Pernod Ricard Annual Report, 2011/2012 
*Source: Pernod Ricard Interim Report, 2012/2013 
The company’s gross margin rates were high (always around 60%) in the last three years, and 
have been advancing significantly to reach 61.4% in 2011/2012 compared to 60.3% the 
previous year and 59.6% in 2010. This is the result of a favorable mix effect related to an 
increase in share of the Top Premium brands, price increases (averaging 3% for the Top 14, in 
the last year) and effective cost control (up 2% excluding mix effects). Net income and diluted 
EPS has grown on average around 10% per year from 2009/2010 to 2011/2012. 
Capitalization 
As for mid April of 2013, Pernod Ricard’s common equity was priced by the market at around € 
24.9bn while the enterprise value, which reflects the market value of the whole business, was 
priced approximately € 34.2bn. Regarding the company’s capital structure, Pernod Ricard has 
                                                             
4
Profit per share from recurring operations adjusted for net interest expense relating to ordinary activities, 
corporate income tax, profits of equity-method companies and profit from assets held for sale (excluding 
discontinued operations) 
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been deleveraging its Balance Sheet and according to its latest financial information (Interim 
Financial Report 2012/2013), 46.8% of the capital was constituted by Debt (short-term and 
long-term). Figure 9 sums up the key figures of Pernod Ricard’s capitalization at the end of 
April 2013: 
Figure 9: Capitalization at 19.04.2013 (in Millions of Euros, except per share items) 
 Apr-19-2013 
Share Price € 94.53 
Shares Outstanding 263.5 
  
Market Capitalization 24,912.3 
- Cash & Short Term Investments 878.0 
+ Total Debt 10,087.0 
+ Pref. Equity - 
+ Total Minority Interest 167.0 
= Total Enterprise Value (TEV)   34,288.3 
  
Book Value of Common Equity 11,291.0 
+ Pref. Equity - 
+ Total Minority Interest 167.0 
+ Total Debt 10,087.0 
= Total Capital   21,545.0 
   Source: Bloomberg (Apr-19-2013) and Pernod Ricard Annual Report, 2011/2012 
Figures 9, and 10, present a summary of Pernod Ricard’s capitalization resorting to two 
fundamental metrics in business valuation - Enterprise Value and Market Cap – and, to Total 
Capital according to accounting numbers. The market is valuing the company, and its equity, 
higher than accounting is. 
Figure 10: Capitalization at 19.04.2013 (in Millions of Euros) 
 
               Source: Bloomberg (Apr-19-2013) and Pernod Ricard Annual Report, 2011/2012 
Valuation Multiples 
As already discussed in the Literature Review section, valuation multiples can be very useful in 
valuing a business by using data somewhat likely to reliably represent the market’s direction. 
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In this sense, figure 11 presents some of the main Pernod Ricard’s multiples which will be of 
valuable use when comparing Pernod Ricard’s to its target and competitor, Beam. 
Figure 11: Valuation Multiples based on capitalization at 19.04.2013 
 
For the Fiscal Period Ending 
12 Months  
Jun-30-2012 
12 Months  
Dec-31-2012 
TEV/Total Revenue 4.2x 4.1x 
TEV/EBITDA 16.0x 15.0x 
TEV/EBIT 17.4x 16.2x 
P/Diluted EPS 22.1x 21.3x 
P/BV 2.3x 2.2x 
Source: Bloomberg (Apr-19-2013) and Pernod Ricard Annual Report, 2011/2012 
Because EV is a capital structure-neutral metric, multiples such as TEV/EBITDA are useful to 
compare returns between equivalent companies on a risk-adjusted basis. The values presented 
by the P/E and P/BV ratios suggest that the market believes in Pernod Ricard’s business future 
grow. 
Stock Performance 
Pernod Ricard’s share performance in the market has been accompanying the overall 
company’s trajectory of good performance and growth (52 week return of 7.1%). The 52 week 
(between August 2012 and August 2013) high was € 101.15 while the 52 week low was € 
82.31, as depicted in figure 12 below. 
Figure 12: Pernod Ricard S.A. - ENXTPA:RI - Share Pricing  
 
Share Price Performance (%) 3 month 6 month 12 month 
Absolute (0.2) (5.5) 7.1 
Rel. to S&P 500 (0.9) (10.2) (4.0) 
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Even though Pernod Ricard’s shares have yield a 7.1% capital gain over the last 52 weeks (as of 
August 2013), the stock has underperformed the market (CAC 40 Index used as the reference) 
by 4% during the same period.  
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3.3 BEAM Inc. 
Description 
Beam Inc. manufactures and sells distilled spirits worldwide, and unlike Pernod Ricard, Beam is 
not in the wines business. The company’s principal products include bourbon whiskey, tequila, 
Scotch whisky, Canadian whisky, vodka, cognac, rum, cordials, and ready-to-drink pre-mixed 
cocktails. It offers its products under several brands identified by the company as Power 
Brands, Rising Stars, Local Jewels and Value Creators. The Power Brands are the core brand 
equities, with global reach in premium categories and large annual sales volume. Rising Stars 
are smaller premium brands in priority markets that Beam believes to have excellent growth 
profiles and receive substantial brand investment to drive expansion. Brands identified as Local 
Jewels act as Power Brands in local markets. Value Creators include a variety of brands 
providing scale and profit across multiple categories. The company sells its products to 
wholesale distributors, state governments, third party distributors, global or regional duty free 
customers, other spirits producers, and joint ventures. The company was formerly known as 
Fortune Brands, Inc. and changed its name to Beam Inc. in October 2011. Beam Inc. was 
founded in 1904 and is headquartered in Deerfield, Illinois. 
History and Strategy 
The company started its business in 1986 following the merger between American Brands, Inc. 
and The American Tobacco Company in December 1985 in which the shares of the principal 
first-tier subsidiaries formerly held by American New Jersey were transferred to the newly 
formed firm. The firm then assumed all liabilities and obligations in respect of the public debt 
securities of American New Jersey outstanding immediately prior to the merger. In May 1997, 
the Company’s name was changed from American Brands, Inc. to Fortune Brands, Inc. (BEAM 
Annual Report, 2012). After the separation of the Company’s Home & Security, Golf and Spirits 
business segments in 2010, the firm sold the Golf business and completed the tax-free spin-off 
of the Home & Security business in 2011, thus becoming a standalone spirits company under 
the name Beam Inc. Likewise Pernod Ricard, and its industry spirits, Beam has also been 
pursuing a dual strategy, in its short life, both focused in internal growth, and shareholder 
value enhancement through acquisitions and divestitures, joint ventures, alliances, and other 
strategic initiatives. In May 2012, Beam has acquired the Pinnacle vodka and Calico Jack rum 
brands and certain related assets for approximately $ 608 million, in a well-succeeded 
transaction which significantly increased Beam’s U.S. presence in the vodka category while 
creating opportunities to drive cost savings and expand distribution (BEAM Annual Report, 
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2012). Beam has also engaged in two similar thriving acquisitions in 2011 and also 2012 of 
Cooley Distillery plc, an award-winning independent Irish whiskey producer and Skinnygirl, a 
ready-to-drink cocktail business, thus allowing the firm to enter in two of the industry’s fastest 
growing categories. 
Organization, key segments and brands  
Beam’s three reportable segments are the geographic regions of North America, EMEA 
(Europe/Middle East/Africa) and APSA (Asia Pacific/South America). Each segment is engaged 
in the manufacture and sale of distilled spirits products. Approximately 55% of the 
consolidated net sales were generated in the U.S. (based on country of destination) in the year 
ended December 31, 2012. 
As already mentioned, Beam divides its products under several brands identified by the 
company as Power Brands, Rising Stars, Local Jewels and Value Creators. Power Brands, Rising 
Stars, and combined Local Jewels/Value Creators (including non-branded sales) represent 
approximately 60%, 15%, and 25%, respectively, of the company’s net sales. The Power Brands 
and Rising Stars, which are the focus of the brand investment, include Jim Beam Bourbon, 
Maker’s Mark Bourbon, Sauza Tequila, Courvoisier Cognac, Canadian Club Whisky, Teacher’s 
Scotch, Pinnacle Vodka (all Power Brands), Laphroaig Scotch, Knob Creek Bourbon, Basil 
Hayden’s Bourbon, Kilbeggan Irish Whiskey, Cruzan Rum, Hornitos Tequila, Skinnygirl Cocktails, 
and Sourz Liqueurs (all Rising Stars). 
Regarding each one of the geographic regions segmented by the company, sales have growth 
at a different pace between 2010 and 2012, as depicted in figure 13.  
Figure 13: Net Sales by Region (in millions of US Dollars) 
Source: Beam Annual Report, 2012 
Beam has seen its net sales growing the most in the North America region (CAGR of 11.7%) 
followed by the APSA region and finally the EMEA region. It is important to refer that Beam’s 
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evolution of sales clearly illustrates some of the trends identified in the spirits industry, in 
particular the fascination of the American Whiskey Bourbon (powering most of the growth in 
the EMEA and especially in the APSA region) as well as the “Premiumization” (most of Beam’s 
portfolio is constituted by premium spirits which explains the high growth experienced by 
Beam in past years). Similarly to Pernod Ricard’s method of valuation, also Beam top line 
forecasts will be made according to its geographical allocation (revenues will be forecasted 
separately for North America, EMEA and APSA).  
Financial Information 
Key statistics 
As presented in figure 14 below, total revenues of Beam range between $ 2.1bns and $ 2.5bns 
(CAGR = 8.5%) from 2010 to 2012 which is less than half of the revenues of Pernod Ricard 
during that period (€ 7.1bns and 8.5bns – CAGR= 9.6%). 
Figure 14: Key Financials (in Millions of U.S. Dollars, except per share items) 
 12 Months  
Dec-31-2010 
12 Months  
Dec-31-2011 
12 Months  
Dec-31-2012 
Total Revenue 2,095 2,311 2,466 
    Growth over prior period 5.8% 10.3% 6.7% 
Gross Profit 1,234 1,346 1,439 
     Margin % 58.9% 58.2% 58.4% 
EBITDA 745 768 738 
    Margin % 35.6% 33.2% 29.9% 
Net Income 487 911 382 
    Margin % 23.3% 39.4% 15.5% 
Diluted EPS 2.01 0.84 2.48 
    Growth over prior period 29.7% (57.9%) 193.2% 
Source: Bloomberg (Apr-22-2013) and Beam Annual Report, 2012 
Beam’s gross margin rates were high (around 58%) in the last three years just like Pernod 
Ricard’s, eventhough Pernod’s margins are slightly higher (around 60%). Similarly to Pernod’s, 
this is the result of a favorable mix effect related to an increase in share of the Top Premium 
brands, price increases, and effective cost control. Diluted EPS has grown on average around 
11% per year from 2010 to 2012, 1% higher than Pernod Ricard’s diluted EPS growth. 
Capitalization 
Beam’s market capitalization is, in April 2013, around $ 10.4bn (less than half of Pernod Ricard 
with € 24.9bn) while the enterprise value, which reflects the market value of the whole 
business, was priced approximately at $ 12.5bn while Pernod Ricard’s was $ 44.4bn 
(considering an exchange rate of $1.30/€ - source ECB on 22nd April 2013). The big difference, 
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of about $ 32bn, between the two enterprise values is further exacerbated by the different 
capital structure of both companies: Beam has relatively low debt, with 35.2% of the capital 
being constituted by debt while Pernod has a Debt-to-Capital ratio of 46.8%, besides that, 
Pernod has almost three times the value in cash than Beam does. The key figures of Beam’s 
capitalization at the end of April 2013 are presented below in figure 15: 
Figure 15: Capitalization at 22.04.2013 (in Millions of U.S. Dollars, except per share items) 
 Apr-22-2013 
Share Price $ 64.64 
Shares Outstanding 160.4 
  
Market Capitalization 10,369.2 
- Cash & Short Term Investments 365.7 
+ Total Debt 2,505.0 
+ Pref. Equity - 
+ Total Minority Interest - 
= Total Enterprise Value (TEV)   12,508.5 
  
Book Value of Common Equity 4,612.1 
+ Pref. Equity - 
+ Total Minority Interest - 
+ Total Debt 2,505.0 
= Total Capital   7,117.1 
   Source: Bloomberg (Apr-22-2013) and Beam Annual Report, 2012 
Both figures 15 and 16 present a summary of Beam’s capitalization resorting to two 
fundamental metrics in business valuation - Enterprise Value and Market Cap – and, to Total 
Capital according to accounting numbers. Just like Pernod Ricard the market is valuing Beam, 
and its equity, higher than accounting is. 
Figure 16: Capitalization at 22.04.2013 (in Millions of U.S. Dollars) 
Source: Bloomberg (Apr-22-2013) and Beam Annual Report, 2012 
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Valuation Multiples 
Valuation by multiples is particularly useful for comparing market’s opinion between 
companies and industries. Given this, when comparing Beam with Pernod Ricard using such 
metrics, it is possible to observe that at the end of 2012 both companies have similar ratios, 
which is perfectly common between two companies operating in the same industry and at 
close level of competition.  
Figure 17: Valuation Multiples based on capitalization at 22.04.2013 
                                                                     Beam Inc. Pernod Ricard 
 
For the Fiscal Period Ending 
12 Months  
Dec-31-2011 
12 Months  
Dec-31-2012 
12 Months  
Dec-31-2012 
TEV/Total Revenue 5.4x 5.1x 4.1x 
TEV/EBITDA 16.2x 16.7x 15.0x 
TEV/EBIT 21.8x 19.6x 16.2x 
P/Diluted EPS 76.5x 26.1x 21.3x 
P/BV 2.5x 2.2x 2.2x 
  Source: Bloomberg (Apr-22-2013) and Beam Annual Report, 2012 
It is however noticeable that Beam has a slightly higher price in the market when compared to 
its accounting items than Pernod Ricard (almost all of the multiples are at least 1x higher in 
Beam than in Pernod). This can indicate that the market sees Beam with a higher potential to 
grow and therefore prices it higher in the current moment. Regarding the deal being proposed 
in this paper, the fact that the market sees Beam with potential to grow can be interpreted as 
a good signal for the merger, however it also means that the company may not trade at a 
discount in the stock market, which is usually a very important pre-determinant fact for this 
type of deal to ultimately go forward.   
Stock Performance 
Beam’s share performance in the market has been somewhat volatile (with very frequent 
oscillations of value, although not very wide changes). The 52 week (between August 2012 and 
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        Figure 18: Beam Inc. - NYSE:BEAM - Share Pricing 
 
Share Price Performance (%) 3 month 6 month 12 month 
Absolute (2.0) 6.8 8.5 
Rel. to S&P 500 (5.7) (4.2) (10.0) 
          Source: Bloomberg (Aug-26-2013) 
Beam’s one year performance in the market has yield shareholders with a 8.5% capital gain, 
however, the stock has underperformed the market (S&P 500 used as a proxy) by as much as 
10%. It should be taken into account that the S&P 500 is currently going through an incredible 
bull market with some sectors yielding uncommon returns, nonetheless, questions regarding 
Beam’s direction in the market could be a good reason for a potential M&A deal given the fact 
that the spirits industry is consolidating, with more than 40 deals in 14 years with an EBITDA 
multiple range of 5x to 23x (Beam currently presents an EBITDA multiple of 16.7x). 
Conclusion 
This section has identified the key characteristics and motors of the spirits industry: history of 
consolidation through M&A deals (over 40 in 14 years); market dominated by the big players; 
vodka and whiskey account for a bit more than 50% of the spirits produced and consumed in 
the US market; flavored spirits, premium products, expanded consumer access, especially in 
emerging markets, and finally the world fascination for American whiskey (bourbon), have 
been the engines of this industry that worldwide grew by an average of 2.5% (year on year) 
between 2006 and 2010, and is expected to grow at an yearly rate of 3% until 2015. 
Both Pernod and Beam are key industry players in the spirits industry and have been the reflex 
of how the industry have evolved by attaining consistent growth in sales benefiting from their 
premium portfolios and increased access to new markets (in particular, Asia). Financially, both 
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4. Valuations 
The following section is dedicated to a crucial step in the study of the proposed deal between 
Beam Inc. (US) and Pernod Ricard S.A. (French): the standalone valuations of both companies. 
This step is required as a mean to value the deal, the merged companies with synergies, and to 
compare the value eventually created for shareholders after the deal with the value of both 
companies before the deal has occurred.  
The methodology followed to value each of the companies separately relies heavily on what 
was identified in the literature review chapter to be the key valuation approaches considered 
nowadays by the finance academics, however, this paper also relies, to a large extent, on real 
market information such as real equity research analysts expectations and opinions, always in 
a critical way. Comparisons between market players’ expectations and the expectations drawn 
from this paper research will be offered, and analyzed in a critical manner as for a clearer 
indication on how the separate values of both companies were obtained. Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that the purpose of this paper is not to impersonate an equity research note; 
therefore this section will not present an extremely detailed description of all the 
considerations used to value both companies, it will on the other hand highlight the major 
value drivers and financial techniques influencing the sole value of each company. The detailed 
descriptions will be saved for the next chapter, where the M&A transaction will be valued and 
synergies will be measured.  
4.1 BEAM Valuation 
4.1.1 Key considerations and Value Drivers 
Regarding BEAM’s valuation it should be noted that the considerations included in the 
valuation model used are based on the company’s public information, strategic objectives, 
market data and the way the firm has evolved over the past years as well as the industry it 
operates. For that, historical data was used from the FY2010 onwards (information only 
available from that date) and the financial statements were worked towards a reorganization 
that allows for a more robust assessment of operating performance and value. This happens 
because traditional accounting statements are not organized in a way that clearly separates 
items that can be from operating, non-operating and financing sources, which in turn can lead 
to common traps of double-counting, omitting cash flows, or hiding leverage. 
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In face of what was presented in the literature review section, BEAM is valued according to a 
discounted cash flow analysis being the WACC, on a first approach, the discount rate used to 
derive the present value of the forecasted stream of future cash-flows. With this in mind, and 
recalling that the mainstream DCF model applies to value a business as a whole (through the 
FCFF) the first key consideration lye on how to decide to compute the FCFF, which is nothing 
more than the cash flow available to the company’s suppliers of capital after all operating 
expenses (including taxes) have been paid and necessary investments in working capital and 
fixed capital have been met. There are four possible ways to arrive at the FCFF, by starting with 
one of four different financial statement items (net income, EBIT, EBITDA, or cash flow from 
operations) and then making the appropriate adjustments. The FCFF used in the valuation of 
BEAM is calculated from earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT): 
FCFF = EBIT (1-T) – CAPEX + Depreciation - ∆NWC +/- other noncash charge 
Consequently, there are two commonly ways used to forecast future FCFF: either to calculate 
the FCFF in the most recent year, and project directly how the FCFF would grow, or, using a 
more realistic and flexible method, by forecasting the underlying components of free cash flow 
and calculate each year separately, assuming that each component of FCFF is growing at a 
different rate over some short-term horizon, resorting to the already mentioned explicit 
period. The model used to value BEAM resorts to the second alternative as to more effectively 
incorporate the value drivers identified in the companies and industry analysis presented in 
this dissertation.  
Based on the method chosen to forecast the FCFF for BEAM, the model starts with top line 
organic sales assumptions for the future, tying the sales forecasts to future costs of Revenue 
and SG&A, capital expenditures, depreciation expenses, and changes in working capital, thus 
forecasting all the components of FCFF. Moreover, top line forecasts are made according to its 
geographical allocation (revenues are forecasted separately for North America, EMEA and 
APSA), and then consolidated as total revenues, influencing from then on the forecasts of 
more bottom line items.  
As a model developed by an outside analyst with limited access to information, the forecast of 
revenues had to rely on verifiable variables and, to try to be as reliable as possible, it had to be 
kept simple and based on historical information, knowledge about the industry and the key 
value drivers already identified, instead of resorting to more complex and detailed methods 
that try to forecast a multitude of variables in which one faces a higher risk of not being 
accurate. One more general consideration regarding the way the model was built refers to the 
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explicit period of analysis chosen: the explicit period of the model is 5 years, which is in line 
with the explicit period usually used (5 - 15 years as mentioned in the literature review). Even 
though it is more common to use a 10 year period (Jennergren, 2008), a longer time frame is 
also more susceptible to the subjectivities of its assumptions, and besides, as pointed out in 
the literature review the fact that an explicit period is usually between 5 a 15 years contributes 
for the Terminal Value to generally represent well over 75% of the market value estimate 
(Young et al. 1999). 
Revenues 
Beam’s revenues information allows for an analysis segmented by region: North America, 
Eur/MidEast/Africa (EMEA) and Asia Pac/South America (APSA). Approximately 59% of the 
consolidated net sales were generated in North America (based on country of destination) in 
the year ended December 31, 2012, in contrast with 56% in 2011 and 55% in 2010 (this yields a 
6% increase in the percentage of net sales being generated in North America from 2010 to 
2012). On the other hand, this increase in the proportion of sales in the North America region 
is counterbalanced with the decrease in percentage of sales being generated in the EMEA 
region, representing 20.8% of total sales in 2012 (decreased 9% in the three year period) and 
in the APSA region (represents 20.4% in 2012 and has decreased 6% in the same period). 
 Figure 19: Beam’s total Revenues and proportions by regions 
Revenues             
$ in millions, year end December FY10 t. sales % FY11 t. sales % FY12 t. sales % 
       
       NorthAmerica 1,162 55.5% 1,272 56.1% 1,451 58.8% 
Eur/MidEast/Africa (EMEA) 478 22.8% 506 22.3% 513 20.8% 
Asia Pac/South America (APSA) 455 21.7% 487 21.5% 503 20.4% 
Revenues 2,095 100.0% 2,265 100.0% 2,466 100.0% 
 
Being the motto of this valuation “keep it simple”, the way to forecast total future sales relied 
upon two separated and fairly straightforward forecasts: (a) the evolution of the percentage of 
total sales in each region; and (b) the growth of sales in North America, consequently yielding 
for the other two regions, different rates of sales growth depending on the evolution of the 
percentage of total sales computed in first place. 
Regarding the first forecast on the evolution of the percentage of total sales for each region, 
the main value drivers identified in the previous section should be taken into account for this 
task. As such, the trends of expanded consumer access, in particular towards emerging 
markets like Asia, premiumization and demand for flavored products lead to the assumption 
that the APSA region and the North America region (through the leading position acquired by 
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Beam in the US and through the premiumization and demand for flavored products to be 
especially significant in mature markets like the US) will likely cannibalize a share of total 
percentage of sales to the EMEA region. This assumption relies also on the fact that Beam is 
essentially an American company, with its presence and potential to grow more concentrated 
at its home country and that it will continue like that. A further important factor for this 
assumption is that an additional value driver identified in the previous chapter, particularly 
important for Beam, resides mostly in the Australasian part of the world (the value driver is the 
world fascination for American whiskey –bourbon). Given this, figure 20 sum up the evolution 
of the percentage of sales by region: 
Figure 20: Beam’s percentage of total Revenues by region 
Revenues             
% of total, year end December FY12 FY13E FY14E FY15E FY16E FY17E 
       
       NorthAmerica 58.8% 60.0% 60.5% 61.0% 61.5% 62.0% 
Eur/MidEast/Africa (EMEA) 20.8% 20.0% 19.3% 18.5% 17.8% 17.0% 
Asia Pac/South America (APSA) 20.4% 20.0% 20.3% 20.5% 20.8% 21.0% 
Revenues 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
According to the model assumptions, the North America region will increase its dominance of 
sales by 5% between 2012 and 2017 (vs. 6% between 2010 and 2012), the EMEA region will 
decline its weight in total sales by 18% (vs. -9% between 2010 and 2012), and the APSA region 
will increase its sales percentage by 3% (vs. -6% between 2010 and 2012). 
Regarding the second separate forecast (growth of sales in North America) the model takes 
into account historical information from Beam’s revenues, from the revenue in supplier gross 
value and premium spirits in the US (which presented a CAGR of 1%, and 11% respectively for 
the years between 2003 and 2012) and historical and projected rates of growth in the global 
spirits industry. The projected growth for the North America region, as well as for the other 
two regions, is displayed in figure 21 below. 
Figure 21: Beam’s revenues growth 
Revenues (YOY % change)                 
$ in millions, year end December FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13E FY14E FY15E FY16E FY17E 
         
         NorthAmerica n.a. 9.5% 14.1% 9.0% 7.5% 7.0% 6.5% 6.0% 
Eur/MidEast/Africa (EMEA) n.a. 5.9% 1.3% 2.8% 2.6% 2.0% 1.4% 0.7% 
Asia Pac/South America (APSA) n.a. 7.1% 3.1% 4.9% 7.9% 7.4% 6.9% 6.4% 
Revenues n.a. 8.1% 8.9% 6.9% 6.6% 6.1% 5.6% 5.1% 
 
Beam highlighted that they expect the spirits global category to grow approximately3% next 
year, but expects BEAM to outperform the category on the top line. Trends are encouraging in 
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the US, with the category still growing in the 3-4% range, primarily due to strengthening 
price/mix. The forecasts obtained are consistent with the company’s expectations. The growth 
rates yield the following forecasted revenues depicted in figure 22. 
Figure 22: Beam’s revenues 
Revenues             
 
CAGR   
$ in millions, year end December FY12 FY13E FY14E FY15E FY16E FY17E 
 
10/12 13E/17E 
          
          NorthAmerica 1,451 1,581 1,700 1,819 1,937 2,053 
 
11.7% 6.7% 
Eur/MidEast/Africa (EMEA) 513 527 541 552 559 563 
 
3.6% 1.7% 
Asia Pac/South America (APSA) 503 527 569 611 654 695 
 
5.1% 7.2% 




The model expects total revenues to growth at a CAGR of 5.9% between 2013 and 2017 vs. a 
CAGR of 8.5% verified in the years comprising 2010 and 2012. For comparison purposes, the 
market consensus for Beam total revenues in 2016 is $ 3,065M (Bloomberg – 9th Aug. 2013) vs. 
$ 3,149M forecasted, thus, the model’s top line forecasts presented are slightly optimistic 
when compared to market expectations, which, again, meets also the company’s expectations. 
Expenses, CAPEX, NWC and margins 
After forecasting revenues, the model goes on forecasting bottom line items recurring to their 
dependence on sales. Costs of revenues, as well as Selling, General and Administrative 
expenses (SG&A), are expected to rise below sales (based on company’s expectations), both at 
different rates, increasing in that way the operating margin over time, as depicted in figure 23. 
Figure 23: Beam’s operating margins 
OperatingMargin                 
 
FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13E FY14E FY15E FY16E FY17E 
         OperatingMargin 23.4% 22.9% 24.7% 24.5% 26.0% 27.5% 29.0% 30.5% 
 
The tax rate was assumed to remain constant and consistent with the tax rate used to 
compute the cost of capital (20.7% - the effective tax rate verified in fiscal year of 2012). Both 
Capital expenditures (CAPEX) and Depreciation are forecasted based on their historical values 
and weight relative to sales, and then computed for the future at the same decreasing rate 
given both items’ close link and since there is no foreseeable event indicating an opposite 
course for any of these items. 
In order to forecast Net Working Capital (NWC) it was projected, based on historical values, a 
series of metrics such as the number of days sales outstanding, days inventory held, the value 
of prepaid and other current assets as a % of sales (all these for forecasting Total Current 
Assets), the number of days payable outstanding, the value of short-term borrowings as a % of 
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sales and the value of other current liabilities as a % of sales (now these, to forecast Total 
Current Liabilities). These metrics make sense since NWC is a measure of operating liquidity 
and should be directly linked to the company’s level of activity. 
Cost of Capital 
Based on the knowledge described in the literature review chapter about how academics and 
practitioners usually compute the weighted average of the after-tax costs of the different 
sources of capital, commonly referred to as WACC, Beam’s cost of capital was computed. 
Figure 24: Beam’s WACC calculation 
Beam's WACC 
Risk-Free Rate (RF) 2.6% (Bloomberg - 10 Year US Treasury Bonds, as of 5th August 2013)  
Expected Market Return (RM) 9.9% (Bloomberg RM - S&P 500 Index as proxy, as of 5th August 2013)  
Market Risk Premium 7.3% (RM- RF)  
Raw Beta 0.80 (Computed using monthly data for the past 3 years - August 2013) 
Equity Risk Premium 5.8% (Market Risk Premium * Raw Beta) 
Cost of Equity 8.5% (RF + EquityRisk Premium) 
   InterestCoverage Ratio 5.59 (EBIT / InterestExpense) 
Rating (Damodaran) A+ (Damodaran online data – Appendix 7) 
CompanyBorrowing Premium (Spread) 1.4% (Damodaran online data, and the S&P rating BBB-) 
Tax rate 20.7% (Beam Inc. Financial Statements - Effective tax rate in 2012) 
After-Tax Cost of debt 3.2% (RF + Spread) * (1-Tax Rate) 
   EnterpriseValue (EV) 11,919.81 (FY12, in Millions of USD) 
Debt/EV 21.0% (D / EV) 
WACC 7.4% (D / EV) * After-Tax Cost of Debt + (1 - D / EV) * Cost of Equity 
 
Regarding the cost of debt, and as pointed out in the literature review, since a company like 
Beam has all sorts of debt obligations thus making it difficult to get a precise rate of its cost, 
academics suggest the use of a spread over the risk-free rate that reflects the default risk of 
the company. For this, it was used an average spread yielded between two ratings obtained 
from two different sources: (1) the S&P rating agency which rates Beam as BBB- (Bloomberg); 
and (2) the Damodaran online information which yields a credit rating according to a 
company’s coverage ratio and geographical location. Figure 24 sums up the results (after-tax 
cost of debt = 3.2%). On the same line of thought, the cost of equity was computed resorting 
to the model firstly proposed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), Mossin (1966) and Treynor 
(1965), the CAPM. The real market data used, its sources, as well as the methodology applied 
are described in figure 24, altogether yielding a cost of equity of 8.5%. 
Concerning the capital structure, Beam has maintained a stable level of debt in relation to its 
capital. As of year end 2012, the ratio of the market value of Debt in relation to its total 
enterprise value was 21% and it is not expected to significantly change in the near future thus 
allowing for the assumption of this ratio for the computation of WACC. For these reasons, 
David Boquinhas Page 50 
 
given the circumstances in which Beam’s capital structure is surrounded, and given what was 
presented in the literature review concerning the APV approach vs. the WACC approach, it was 
chosen to just present the WACC approach given the lack of value that adding the APV 
approach would bring to this paper.  
The rate at which the WACC, under the assumptions just mentioned and described in figure 
24, will discount the projected free cash-flows is 7.4%, and it is assumed a long term 
sustainable growth rate of 3%, which is a conservative estimate given the average expectations 
of IMF’s forecasted world economy real growth for 2013-2018 (4.1%) and the forecasted 
global spirits growth by volume for the 1st half of the 2010’s of 2.5%/3%. 
In face of what was described above regarding the methodology used and the assumptions 
undertaken, Beam’s total enterprise value is valued at $ 14,413M, which implies an equity 
value of $ 12,274M, corresponding to approximately $ 76.7 a share (appendix 8). The target 
price of Beam’s by market analysts is $ 69.85 (Bloomberg – consensus mean as 9th Aug. 2013). 
Relative valuation 
The peer group selected to value Beam based on its peer’s financial indicators had to respect 
some restrictions in order to provide an accurate comparison. Hence, the companies chosen 
had to operate exclusively within the alcoholic beverage industry, without exception, and 
should have a market capitalization within the range of around $ 10 Billion, up or down from 
Beam’s market capitalization, however exceptions had to be made to incorporate Beam’s close 
competitors such as Diageo and SAB Miller. Figure 25 demonstrates the multiples analysis. 
Figure 25: Peer group and relative valuation 
MultiplesValuation         
Company Market Cap. EV/Sales EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT 
     Brown-Forman Corporation (NYSE:BF.B) 14,321.0 5.3 15.9 16.8 
WuliangyeYibin Co., Ltd. (SZSE:000858) 11,578.9 6.1 16.6 19.7 
Constellation Brands Inc. (NYSE:STZ) 10,229.8 5.3 16.1 19.8 
Pernod-Ricard SA (ENXTPA:RI) 22,954.2 3.7 13.3 14.4 
SABMillerplc (LSE:SAB) 58,276.6 5.3 13.7 17.1 
Molson Coors Brewing Company (NYSE:TAP) 8,949.8 3.3 10.1 12.9 
LuzhouLaojiao Co., Ltd. (SZSE:000568) 4,955.1 7.0 15.6 17.8 
United SpiritsLimited (BSE:532432) 5,207.9 4.6 27.5 19.3 
RémyCointreau SA (ENXTPA:RCO) 3,890.6 3.5 16.9 18.1 
Diageo plc (LSE:DGE) 58,528.8 5.2 14.6 15.9 
     Average 19,889.3 4.9 16.0 17.2 
     Beam, Inc. (NYSE:BEAM) 12,304.7 5.0 16.5 19.3 
     CompanyName 
 
Total Revenue EBITDA EBIT 
Beam, Inc. (NYSE:BEAM) 
 
2,465.9 738.1 627.6 
     ImpliedEnterpriseValue 
 
12,159.4 11,832.5 10,784.7 
     
David Boquinhas Page 51 
 
+ Total Cash & ST Investments 
 
365.7 365.7 365.7 
- Total Debt 
 
2,505.0 2,505.0 2,505.0 
     ImpliedEquityValue 
 
10,020.1 9,693.2 8,645.4 
     Shares Outstanding 
 
160 160 160 
     Implied Price per Share 
 
62.6 60.5 54.0 
 
The information presented in figure 25 was based on the latest annual information from the 
companies. Based on the average of the peer group financial ratios (EV/Sales, EV/EBITDA and 
EV/EBIT), the value implied for Beam ranges between $ 54 and $ 62.6 which represents a 
discount of around $ 15- $20 to the WACC based valuation. The implicit value of Beam by this 
peer group analysis represents also that Beam is trading at a premium in the market with most 
of the past six months being traded at a price above $ 65. 
Beam’s premium relative to its relative valuation can indicate that the market is optimistic 
about the future of Beam which agrees with the WACC based valuation in which Beam’s 
premium is warranted due its accelerating growth, exposure to brown spirits, favorable 
positions in key international markets and the fact that Beam is one of the few non-family 
influenced spirits pure-plays and has a solid presence in bourbon, which is a growing category. 
4.1.2 Results and final considerations  
According to the WACC approach Beam’s share price has the potential to be worth 
approximately $ 76.7, while according to Beam’s peer group analysis a value of no more than $ 
62.6 should correctly price Beam’s value per share. In relation to the WACC approach valuation 
presented in this paper, Beam’s premium is reasonable given a series of factors that had to be 
incorporated in the valuation in the form of assumptions and expectations (it was mentioned 
already some of the factors such as Beam’s great position in key markets and highly demanded 
American whisky – bourbon).  
However, there are risks that may change the price estimated such as a US category 
slowdown, especially in Bourbon or Tequila, trade down or more aggressive promotions by 
peers, a consumption shift into other alcoholic beverage categories, macro/economic 
uncertainty given exposure to Europe and emerging markets. For that reason, it is presented a 
sensitivity analysis for a better comprehension of how sensitive the value obtained can be to 
certain variables: 
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Figure 26: Sensitivity analysis I 
Assumptions 
  Terminal Growth Rate 
 
2.5% 3.0% 3.5% 




77.5    87.2    99.8    
7.4% 
 
 69.0     76.7     86.3    
7.9% 
 
 61.3     67.4     74.9    
 
Figure 26 illustrates how Beam’s share price can diverge when different assumptions regarding 
the cost of capital and the terminal growth rate are applied. Using a range of 50 basis points up 
or down in both variables, the share price can be valued from $ 61.3 to as much as $ 99.8.  
                                                          Figure 27: Sensitivity analysis II 
Assumptions 
  NorthAmericasales growth 
 
Underperform ForecastedScenario Overperform 
     
  
66.7 76.7 86.3 
 
When accounting for possible growth rates in North America’s sales (figure 27), the growth 
engine of Beam, the underperform case scenario (which supposes that this region is going to 
grow at a rate 6% inferior to that of the normal scenario) yields a value of $ 66.7 vs. a $ 86.3 
value in the opposite case scenario (+6% than the normal scenario). 
To conclude, according to the assumptions and the results presented, and taking into 
consideration that BEAM is a leading pure play spirits company, its key markets are the US, 
Australia, the EU and emerging markets representing 15 percent of sales, it is believed that 
Beam is in position to take advantage of growing consumer demand for spirits (particularly 
Bourbon) around the world. BEAM has taken action to raise productivity, streamline 
selling/distribution and increase support for marketing and new products. Therefore, the 
valuation presented tried to incorporate such facts. Further, the spirits industry is 
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4.2 Pernod Ricard Valuation 
4.2.1 Key considerations and Value Drivers 
Pernod Ricard’s valuation closely followed the methodology used to value Beam and already 
described. Even though both companies have a lot in common and it has been useful to apply 
a similar approach regarding the way to forecast future indicators, Pernod has its specificities 
relative to Beam.  
The main value drivers identified are in general similar to the ones identified for Beam, since 
they are common to the entire spirits industry. Emerging markets growth and premium spirits 
growth are the biggest engines for Pernod sales development, as well as for Beam, given their 
increased exposure to these meteoric markets and their more and more appreciated premium 
portfolios. 
As noted, the valuation model for Pernod Ricard follows a very similar approach and 
methodology as the one used to value Beam. The model also starts with top line organic sales 
assumptions for the future, tying the sales forecasts to future costs of Revenue and SG&A, 
capital expenditures, depreciation expenses, and changes in working capital, thus forecasting 
all the components of FCFF. Similarly, top line forecasts are made according to its geographical 
allocation, which are however different from the allocation of Beam (Pernod revenues are 
forecasted separately for the Asia/Rest of world region, Americas, Europe excl. France and 
France), and then consolidated as total revenues, influencing from then on the forecasts of 
more bottom line items. 
Revenues 
Pernod Ricard sales landscape has been changing quite significantly over the past years. While 
in the financial year end of 2010, 32% of sales were generated in the Asia/Rest of the world 
(essentially Asia, because of China) region and 31% were generated in Europe (excl. France), in 
2012, 39% of the sales were being generated in Asia in detriment of the sales generated in 
Europe which in 2012 represented less 5% of total sales than in 2010. Such changes represent 
a 20% increase on the weight of sales being generated in Asia, and a decrease of 15% in 
Europe excl. France (France also lost its weight on total sales by 11% and the Americas 
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Figure 28: Pernod Ricard’s total Revenues and proportions by regions 
Revenues             
€ in millions, year end June FY10 t. sales % FY11 t. sales % FY12 t. sales % 
       Asia/Rest of the world 2,273 32% 2,711 35% 3,165 39% 
Americas 1,911 27% 2,068 27% 2,167 26% 
Europeexcl. France 2,176 31% 2,114 28% 2,137 26% 
France 721 10% 750 10% 746 9% 
Revenues 7,081 100% 7,643 100% 8,215 100% 
 
The method used to forecast total future sales was the same as in Beam’s valuation thus 
relying on two different forecasts: (a) the evolution of the percentage of total sales in each 
region; and (b) the sales growth in the engine region, Asia, consequently yielding for the other 
regions, different rates of sales growth depending on the evolution of the percentage of total 
sales computed in first place.  
Influencing the forecast on the evolution of the percentage of total sales for each region are 
the main trends that have been occurring over the past years as well as the drivers identified 
as shapers for the future growth in the different regions, such as the followings: 
 Within big cap European beverages, Pernod Ricard is the most direct play on the rapid 
growth of international spirits in China, a strong play on broader emerging market 
growth as well as global premiumization trends; 
 Growth of brown spirits in Asia, especially cognac and Scotch whisky; 
 White liquor (vodka, run, gin) and wine remain underpenetrated in Asia; 
 With more than 70% of brands premium or super-premium, premiumization provides 
mix and margin lift; 
Factors like the ones just described lead to the assumption that the Asia/Rest of the World 
region will maintain its growth within the relative weight of its sales to total sales at the 
expense of the diminution of sales generated in Europe (excl. France). Thus, figure 29 sums up 
the evolution of the percentage of Pernod sales by region: 
Figure 29: Pernod Ricard’s percentage of total Revenues by region 
Revenues             
% of total, year end June FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 
       Asia/Rest of the world 39% 42% 43% 44% 45% 46% 
Americas 26% 26% 26% 26% 26% 26% 
Europeexcl. France 26% 23% 23% 22% 21% 20% 
France 9% 9% 9% 8% 8% 8% 
Revenues 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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According to the model assumptions, the Asian region will increase its dominance of sales by 
18% between 2012 and 2017 (vs. 20% between 2010 and 2012) while the Europe region (excl. 
France) will decline its weight in total sales by 22% (vs. -15% between 2010 and 2012). 
Regarding the second separate forecast (growth of sales in Asia) the model takes into account 
historical information from Pernod Ricard’s revenues, from the revenue in supplier gross value 
and premium spirits in the US (which presented a CAGR of 1%, and 11% respectively for the 
years between 2003 and 2012) and historical and projected rates of growth in the global spirits 
industry. The projected growth for the Asia region, as well as for the other three regions, is 
displayed in figure 30 below. 
Figure 30: Pernod Ricard’s revenues growth 
Revenues (YOY % change)                 
€ in millions, year end June FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13E FY14E FY15E FY16E FY17E 
         Asia/Rest of the world 12.3% 19.3% 16.7% 11.0% 9.5% 8.5% 7.5% 6.5% 
Americas -5.7% 8.2% 4.8% 3.0% 6.9% 6.0% 5.1% 4.2% 
Europeexcl. France -10.0% -2.8% 1.1% -7.9% 3.5% 2.5% 1.5% 0.4% 
France -1.9% 4.0% -0.5% 0.1% 3.9% 2.9% 1.9% 0.9% 
Revenues -1.7% 7.9% 7.5% 3.0% 6.9% 6.0% 5.1% 4.2% 
 
Pernod Ricard’s Asian growth engine is expected to slow down within the next years which 
corresponds to 2013 company’s expectations, maintaining however its position of leading 
region, driving Pernod total sales. 
Figure 31: Pernod Ricard’s revenues 
Revenues             
 
CAGR   
€ in millions, year end June FY12 FY13E FY14E FY15E FY16E FY17E 
 
FY08/12 FY13E/17E 
          Asia/Rest of the world 3,165 3,513 3,847 4,174 4,487 4,779 
 
12.1% 8.0% 
Americas 2,167 2,232 2,386 2,529 2,658 2,769 
 
6.3% 5.5% 
Europe excl. France 2,137 1,968 2,037 2,087 2,117 2,127 
 
-0.4% 2.0% 
France 746 747 776 799 814 822 
 
1.2% 2.4% 




Pernod management and most sell-side equity research analysts have stated their 
expectations of a new “normal” growth in Asia, based on the evolution of several of its 
products. Over the past 12 months, Pernod Ricard has stated that it expects cognac volumes to 
grow at mid-single-digit rates due to supply constraints. PR expects the new "normal" to be 
high-single digit to low-double-digit sales growth for some of its products like cognac and high-
single-digit growth for scotch in the medium term, for instance. 
As a result, and given the assumptions used, the model output a conservative growth of sales 
with a CAGR of 8% for sales in Asia between the explicit period (vs. a CAGR of 12.1% between 
2008 and 2012). Altogether, revenues are expected to grow at a CAGR of 5.5% between 2013 
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and 2017 (vs. a 5.7% CAGR between 2008 and 2012). For comparison purposes, market 
consensus on Pernod Ricard total revenues in 2017 is € 10,423M (Bloomberg – 9th Aug. 2013) 
vs. € 10,496M forecasted, which represents a very small difference. On EBIT, market consensus 
is € 2,923M (Bloomberg – 9th Aug. 2013) vs. a forecasted EBIT of € 2,275M which represents a 
more conservative estimate of EBIT than the market.    
Expenses, CAPEX, NWC and margins 
As for Beam valuation, after forecasting revenues, the model goes on forecasting bottom line 
items recurring to their dependence on sales. Costs of revenues are expected to evolve 
according to sales, however, Selling, General and Administrative expenses (SG&A) are 
expected to rise slightly above sales reflecting the tendency of increasing expenses with 
marketing (based on company’s expectations), thus decreasing the operating margin over 
time, as depicted in figure 32. 
Figure 32: Pernod Ricard’s operating margins 
Operating Margin                     
 
FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13E FY14E FY15E FY16E FY17E 
           Operating Margin 23.1% 25.6% 25.4% 25.0% 25.7% 23.7% 23.2% 22.7% 22.2% 21.7% 
 
The tax rate was assumed to remain constant and consistent with the tax rate used to 
compute the cost of capital (23.5% - the effective tax rate verified in fiscal year of 2012). Both 
Capital expenditures (CAPEX) and Depreciation are forecasted exactly the same way as for 
Beam. Based on their historical values and weight relative to sales, and then computed for the 
future at the same decreasing rate given both items’ close link and since there is no 
foreseeable event indicating an opposite course for any of these items. 
In order to forecast Net Working Capital (NWC) it was projected, based on historical values, a 
series of metrics such as the number of days sales outstanding, days inventory held, the value 
of prepaid and other current assets as a % of sales (all these for forecasting Total Current 
Assets), the number of days payable outstanding, the value of short-term borrowings as a % of 
sales and the value of other current liabilities as a % of sales (now these, to forecast Total 
Current Liabilities). These metrics make sense since NWC is a measure of operating liquidity 
and should be directly linked to the company’s level of activity. 
Cost of Capital 
Based on the knowledge described in the literature review chapter about how academics and 
practitioners usually compute the weighted average of the after-tax costs of the different 
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sources of capital, commonly referred to as WACC, Pernod Ricard’s cost of capital was 
computed. 
Figure 33: Pernod Ricard’s WACC calculation 
Pernod Ricard's WACC 
Risk-Free Rate (RF) 1.7% (Bloomberg - 10 Year German Bunds, as of 6th August 2013)  
Expected Market Return (RM) 12.0% (Bloomberg RM: CAC 40 Index as proxy, as of 6th August 2013)  
Market Risk Premium 10.3% (RM- RF)  
Raw Beta 0.65 (Computed using monthly data for the past 3 years - August 2013) 
Equity Risk Premium 6.7% (Market Risk Premium * Raw Beta) 
Cost of Equity 8.4% (RF + Equity Risk Premium) 
   Interest Coverage Ratio 4.06 (EBIT / Interest Expense) 
Rating (Damodaran) A- (Damodaran online data – Appendix 7) 
Borrowing Premium (Spread) 1.7% (Damodaran online data, and the S&P rating BBB-) 
Tax rate 23.5% (Pernod Ricard Financial Statements - Effective tax rate in 2012) 
After-Tax Cost of debt 2.6% (RF + Spread) * (1-Tax Rate) 
   Enterprise Value (EV) 31,706.98 (FY12, in Millions of EUR) 
Debt/EV 32.1% (D / EV) 
WACC 6.5% (D / EV) * After-Tax Cost of Debt + (1 - D / EV) * Cost of Equity 
 
Pernod Ricard’s cost of capital is substantially lower than Beam’s (Pernod = 6.5% vs. Beam = 
7.4%). This difference is due mainly to a slightly lower cost of equity given the ability of Pernod 
to fund itself in the European market, and thus taking advantage of the historical low rates 
that are usually used as a proxy for the risk free. However, the main different resides on the 
after-tax cost of debt (2.6% in Pernod vs. 3.2% in Beam) due to differences on the tax rate and 
on the risk-free rate.  
Concerning the capital structure, Pernod Ricard has been deleveraging its Balance Sheet ever 
since its debt level highly increased with the acquisition of V&S in 2008. As of year end 2012, 
the ratio of the market value of Debt in relation to its total enterprise value was 32% and even 
though it is been decreasing it is not expected to significantly decrease much further given it is 
already close to its historical and industry levels. As such, the model will consider this target 
debt to enterprise value of 32.1% and given the arguments presented and that there is no 
expectation of significant financial maneuvers that could be better captured recurring to an 
APV based approach, the only DCF methodology used will be the WACC based approach. The 
rate at which the WACC, under the assumptions just mentioned and described in figure 24, will 
discount the projected free cash-flows is 6.5%, and it is assumed a long term sustainable 
growth rate of 3%, which is a conservative estimate given the average expectations of IMF’s 
forecasted world economy real growth for 2013-2018 (4.1%) and the forecasted global spirits 
growth by volume for the 1st half of the 2010’s of 2.5%/3%. 
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In face of what was described above regarding the methodology used and the assumptions 
undertaken, Pernod Ricard’s total enterprise value is valued at € 40,932M, which implies an 
equity value of € 31,375M, corresponding to approximately € 119.1 a share (appendix 9). The 
target price of Pernod Ricard’s by market analysts is € 97.23 (Bloomberg – consensus mean as 
9th Aug. 2013). 
Relative valuation 
The peer group selected to value Pernod Ricard based on its peer’s financial indicators had to 
respect some restrictions in order to provide an accurate comparison. Hence, the companies 
chosen had to operate exclusively within the alcoholic beverage industry, without exception. 
Pernod Ricard main peers however can have very different values of market capitalizations 
given the very different markets in which they operate (for instance, United Spirits operates in 
India) thus the market capitalization was not an exclusive factor, although it was indicative. 
The main criteria used to choose the peer group was definitely the fact of whether the 
companies operate in the alcoholic beverage industry or not (in particular, spirits industry 
and/or big players in beer/wine products), which given the fact that this is such a concentrated 
market limits many of the possibilities. Figure 34 demonstrates the multiples analysis. 
Figure 34: Peer group and relative valuation 
Multiples Valuation         
Company Market Cap. EV/Sales EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT 
     Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV (ENXTBR:ABI) 117,386.8 4.1 13.8 16.2 
Brown-Forman Corporation (NYSE:BF.B) 14,321.0 5.3 15.9 16.8 
Diageo plc (LSE:DGE) 58,528.8 5.2 14.6 15.9 
Heineken NV (ENXTAM:HEIA) 29,756.2 2.3 11.0 17.0 
United Spirits Limited (BSE:532432) 5,207.9 4.6 27.5 19.3 
Beam, Inc. (NYSE:BEAM) 12,304.7 5.0 16.5 19.3 
Reckitt Benckiser Group plc (LSE:RB.) 37,546.6 3.5 13.6 14.5 
RémyCointreau SA (ENXTPA:RCO) 3,890.6 3.5 16.9 18.1 
SABMiller plc (LSE:SAB) 58,276.6 5.3 13.7 17.1 
Constellation Brands Inc. (NYSE:STZ) 10,229.8 5.3 16.1 18.4 
     Average 34,744.9 4.4 16.0 17.3 
     Pernod-Ricard SA (ENXTPA:RI) 22,954.2 3.7 13.3 14.4 
     Company Name 
 
Total Revenue EBITDA EBIT 
Pernod-Ricard SA (ENXTPA:RI) 
 
8,575.0 2,402.0 2,230.0 
     Implied Enterprise Value 
 
37,790.0 38,335.9 38,496.5 
     + Total Cash & ST Investments 
 
620.0 620.0 620.0 
- Total Debt 
 
9,521.0 9,521.0 9,521.0 
- Minority Interest 
 
168.0 168.0 168.0 
     Implied Equity Value 
 
28,721.0 29,266.9 29,427.5 
     Shares Outstanding 
 
264 264 264 
     Implied Price per Share 
 
109.0 111.1 111.7 
 
David Boquinhas Page 59 
 
The information presented in figure 34 was based on the latest annual information from the 
companies. Based on the average of the peer group financial ratios (EV/Sales, EV/EBITDA and 
EV/EBIT), the value implied for Pernod Ricard ranges between € 109 and € 111.7 which 
represents a discount of around € 8 - € 10 to the WACC based valuation. The implicit value of 
Pernod Ricard by this peer group analysis represents that Pernod is trading at a discount in the 
market with its 52 week high being only € 101.2, denoting some undervaluation and/or 
concerns by the market participants. 
4.2.2 Results and Final Considerations 
According to the WACC approach Pernod Ricard’s share price has the potential to be worth 
approximately € 119.1, similarly with the peer group analysis which value Pernod in between € 
109 and € 111. Pernod’s valuation premium is due to its leading positions in the top3 regional 
markets of China, India and Travel Retail, premiumization, acceleration of growth in categories 
such as vodka, malt, champagne and wine, expansion to new territories through higher share 
as well as geographic expansion and effective marketing. 
Nonetheless there are several factors able of impacting the future of Pernod value, some 
positive, some negative. On the upside, Pernod’s value can benefit from a faster than expected 
recovery in demand in China and a more robust pricing in the U.S. On the other hand, a further 
deterioration in demand in some regions of western Europe, a further slowdown in emerging 
markets growth, any further pressure on cash flow and further EUR weakness can negatively 
impact Pernod’s value. For that reason, it is presented a sensitivity analysis for a better 
comprehension of how sensitive the value obtained can be to certain variables: 
Figure 35: Sensitivity analysis I 
Assumptions 
Terminal Growth Rate 
2.5% 3.0% 3.5% 
     
WACC 
6.0% 123.2    145.9    177.7    
6.5%  102.7     119.1     140.8    
7.0%    89.3     102.0     118.4    
 
Figure 35 illustrates how Beam’s share price can diverge when different assumptions regarding 
the cost of capital and the terminal growth rate are applied. Using a range of 50 basis points up 
or down in both variables, the share price can be valued from € 89.3 to as much as € 177.7. 
Figure 36: Sensitivity analysis I 
Assumptions 





    
 
98.9 119.1 139.8 
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When accounting for possible growth rates in Asia’s sales (figure 36), the growth engine of 
Pernod Ricard, the underperform case scenario (which supposes that this region is going to 
grow at a rate 6% inferior to that of the normal scenario) yields a value of € 98.9 vs. a € 139.8 
value in the opposite case scenario (+6% than the normal scenario). 
Both Beam and Pernod Ricard valuations were performed resorting to straightforward 
assumptions based on each company’s public information, managements public expectations, 
real market data, equity research analysts’ studies and industry insights. Beam’s value under 
the WACC based approach is of $ 76.7 per share (vs. market consensus of $ 69.85), while its 
peer group analysis indicates a value slightly lower of around $ 60 per share. Pernod Ricard 
valuation under the WACC approach is more congruent with its multiples valuation with a 
value per share of € 119.1 and around € 111 for each respective valuation method (vs. market 
consensus of € 97.23).  
The methods used only try to model how the current public information influences the value 
of these companies, and given that it resorts only to public information, accurate estimates 
had to remain simple and verifiable. To counteract such limitations, it was provided a 
complementary sensitivity analysis to better understand how these firms’ values can change 
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5. The Merger 
This chapter is devoted to the detailed study of how the proposed merger between Pernod 
Ricard and Beam could develop, be valued and create value. Previous chapters have defined 
synergies as the additional value produced by two combining firms that together create 
opportunities that would not otherwise been created. This section will enlighten what these 
opportunities can be for the two companies under analysis and what value could outcome 
from the proposed deal for the shareholders of both firms. However, the way the deal is 
structured both at a strategic and financial level will impact the ultimate value creation that 
can arise from such deal. For that reason, the structure and mechanics of the deal will be 
closely analyzed in order to understand how the value of this deal can be created and 
maximized given the knowledge about the stylized facts on M&A deals previously described in 
the literature review chapter. 
5.1 The Merged Entity 
As Damodaran (2005) argues, it is important to keep the value of the synergies apart from the 
value of control when valuing the synergies. According to the author, after valuing the firms 
involved in the merger independently, one should then value the combined firm with no 
synergies, and only then value the combined firm with synergies.  
5.1.1 Consolidation and cross border issues  
The purpose of valuing the merged entity without considering any synergies is to make sure 
that the new valuation model is based on the same structural assumptions considered when 
valuing the firms separately, thus inferring that both companies value when added together 
should yield the same value of the merged entities without considering the potential 
synergies. 
However, this approach is not exactly suitable for the type of merger under study, which is a 
cross border merger with both firms’ headquarters operating in different countries. What this 
implies is that both firms’ costs of capital are substantially different, considering a WACC based 
approach, when it comes to the inputs and assumptions used. For this reason, and in this case, 
when computing a new cost of capital with assumptions that seem reasonable for the new 
entity, one is automatically computing a WACC that may deliver a different value for the 
combined firm than the sum of both separate firms, even if the rest of the valuation model is 
based on the same structural assumptions. So, in this case, the WACC that yields a value for 
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the merged entity equal to the sum of the separate values of both companies would be 
different in its essence from the WACC that can be computed with more reasonable 
assumptions which yields a slightly different value for the merged entity than the sum of both 
firms’ separate values. 
As just mentioned, the computation of a new WACC for the merged entity, all else remaining 
equal regarding the forecasts of all the other financial statements’ items, can yield a different 
value for the new company when compared to the assumed value without synergies (sum of 
both standalone valuations). However, the computation of the new cost of capital resorts to 
simple and realistic assumptions and it follows the same technique used to compute the 
separate WACCs.  
Figure 37: After consolidation cost of capital 
After - Merger WACC 
Risk-Free Rate (RF) 1.7% (Bloomberg - 10 Year German Gvt Bonds, as of 6th August 2013)  
Expected Market Return (RM) 12.0% (Bloomberg RM: CAC 40 Index as proxy, as of 6th August 2013)  
Market Risk Premium 10.3% (RM- RF)  
Raw Beta 0.68 (Weighted average by EV of both companies Betas) 
Equity Risk Premium 7.1% (Market Risk Premium * Raw Beta) 
Cost of Equity 8.8% (RF + Equity Risk Premium) 
   Interest Coverage Ratio 4.27 (EBIT / Interest Expense) 
Rating (Damodaran) A- (Damodaran online data) 
Borrowing Premium (Spread) 1.3% (Damodaran online data) 
Tax rate 23.5% (Pernod Ricard Effective tax rate in 2012) 
After-Tax Cost of debt 2.3% (RF + Spread) * (1-Tax Rate) 
   Enterprise Value (EV) 40,741.25 (Bloomberg - as of FY12) 
Target Debt/EV 32.9% (D/EV) 
WACC 6.6% (D / EV) * After-Tax Cost of Debt + (1 - D / EV) * Cost of Equity 
 
Figure 37 describes step-by-step the sources and rationales behind the values used to compute 
the new WACC. Regarding the cost of equity, the only difference from the post-merger WACC 
to the acquiring firm (Pernod) WACC is the beta, since Beam’s correlation with the market 
needs to be taken into account when computing the overall new company’s correlation with 
the market. For that, it was computed the weighted average by enterprise value of both 
companies’ betas, yielding a slightly higher beta than Pernod’s beta, thus explaining the 
increased cost of equity after the two companies merge. The after-tax cost of debt however, 
slightly decreased given Beam’s better financial flexibility which improves the overall rating of 
the total debt, thus lowering the spread paid when compare to Pernod alone. Overall, the new 
cost of capital is 6.6% (vs. Pernod Ricard’s WACC of 6.5% and Beam’s WACC of 7.4%). 
Therefore, and given that the difference in the computed enterprise value between the 
combined firm (€ 51,919M) and the sum of both companies (€ 51,880M) is only € 38M (which 
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represents 0.07% of the total enterprise value of the combined firm), it will be assumed that 
the consolidated company’s value is the one computed with the new WACC, thus the EV of the 
combined firm of € 51,919M will be the EV assumed for the rest of the analysis on the merger 
between both companies. 
An additional matter regarding the specifics of a cross border deal has to do with the 
consolidation of the two companies, valued and forecasted at different exchange rates. In 
order for an accurate estimation of the consolidated items that constitute the merged entity, 
Beam’s financial statements need to be converted into the acquirer’s home currency, the euro. 
Frood & Kester (1995) provide an insightful study on cross border valuation, and according to 
the authors, one of the approaches that can be used in a situation like this involves the 
conversion of the items from the foreign currency to the home currency at the expected future 
exchange rates. The paper’s authors claim that this method can be particularly useful if the 
foreign currency is sensitive to exchange rates. To choose a different approach would imply an 
assumption that the exchange rate would not fluctuate throughout the explicit period, which 
does not seem like a realistic assumption for the USD/EUR exchange rate when forecasting five 
years of financial statement items. 
On an additional note, when consolidating revenues, the segmentation considered was the 
one used by Pernod Ricard: Asia/Rest of World, Americas, Europe excl. France and France. 
Thus, Beam’s revenues in North America add to Pernod’s revenues of Americas, the EMEA 
region revenues sum to the Europe excl. France revenues, and the APSA region add to 
Pernod’s revenues of Asia/Rest of World. 
Thus, Beam’s financial statements as well as the items forecasted were converted from US 
Dollars to Euros, using final year historical rates for past years’ information and the forward 
exchange rates for the explicit period forecasts: 
Figure 38: Forecasted exchange rates 
Forward exchange rates USD/EUR as of 1
st
 Sept. 2013 (Bloomberg)     
  FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13E FY14E FY15E FY16E FY17E 
         $/€   1.3362      1.2939      1.3194      1.3196      1.3219      1.3296      1.3432      1.3600    
 
The entire valuation of Beam was then computed in Euros yielding an enterprise value of € 
10,948M. 
All considered, it will be recognized the value of the merged entity without synergies as the 
value of the consolidated company discounted at the new WACC (EV = € 51,919M) in 
detriment of the sum of both Beam and Pernod Ricard standalone valuations previously 
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computed (in which Beam EV in € = 10,948M + Pernod Ricard EV in € = 40,932M = Total EV = € 
51,880M). 
5.1.2 Synergies analysis 
An agreement to combine both Beam and Pernod Ricard has the potential to create 
innumerous valuable opportunities that do not exist with these companies operating 
separately. Such opportunities however need to be cautiously assessed as it was demonstrated 
in the literature review how “foggy” this assessment can be. The following sub-section will 
closely analyze the different types of synergies that can be created from different sources such 
as operating and financial synergies.  
Operating synergies 
Operating synergies, as the name suggests, refer to those opportunities that can arise at an 
operational level with the potential to increase the operating income and/or its growth. As 
such, possible operational synergies can arise from generally two operating sources: operating 
revenues and, operating costs. It is widely regarded that cost synergies are usually more prone 
to be realistically estimated as they are concerned with internal issues and less dependent on 
the market’s and competitors’ response, as it is the case with synergies originated at the 
revenue side.  
Besides synergies at the top line items, there are also potential opportunities that can be 
generated at the working capital and capital expenditures level which can be considered as 
synergies or directly influence the creation of synergies at operating levels.  
Revenue synergies 
As just mentioned, identifying and valuing revenue synergies is a task subject to more bias and 
subjectivity than performing it on cost synergies given the revenue dependency on external 
factors difficult to predict in a reliable way. With this in mind, Sirower & Sahni (2006) argue 
that a 100 day period past the consolidation should pass in order for the deferred revenue 
synergies that can outcome from the merger can be noticed. 
By taking a conservative approach when trying to identify potential synergies one can 
recognize however that a merger between Beam and Pernod Ricard would possibly create 
opportunities in its top line items through the reduced competition and higher market shares 
expected after the consolidation process. For instance, within the U.S. market a merger 
between Beam and Pernod would give place to a 19% market share for the new company 
David Boquinhas Page 65 
 
(getting close to Diageo’s market share of 26%) instead of the 10% market share for Beam and 
8% share for Pernod while operating separately (appendix 4 and 5).  
A KPMG study which surveyed 101 CEO’s and other top executives in the food and beverage 
industry in 2011 revealed important findings regarding top management expectations and 
beliefs on the future of their businesses. Amid various curious results, one of them pops out as 
noteworthy for the study of Beam and Pernod Ricard merger synergies’ analysis: 72% of the 
surveyed managers recognized their company’s databases and information on its customers as 
one of the core components of growth drive, as it allows companies to gain a competitive 
edge, adapt to changes in consumer behavior, and interface with customers. This can be a 
major opportunity for a joint between Beam and Pernod, as these companies would be able to 
merge their customer’s databases therefore accessing new clients and better adapting to their 
consumer behaviors with a more complete portfolio of spirits’ brands able to suit more 
preferences.  
Moreover, Pernod Ricard acquired Vin & Sprit (V&S) in 2008, owner of the Absolut brand, in a 
merger similar in a variety of aspects, though with a slightly smaller dimension, to the one 
being studied in this paper. Some inferences can be made from such deal in order to 
understand how this merger can create value. The acquisition of V&S in 2008 was able to 
mainly prove that Pernod Ricard definitely had the clout, especially in terms of distribution, to 
move Absolut on to the next level. Total expected synergies derived from both cost reduction 
and integration of distribution margin estimated between €125m and €150m and the full 
extraction of synergies was expected over 2 to 4 years.  
To conclude, revenue synergies can definitely be difficult to distinguish and value, however, 
this chapter showed how it is possible to create opportunities that otherwise would not be 
created at revenue levels. Taking this into consideration, and mainly based on the increase in 
market share of the new company as well as the potential to cross databases on customers 
information allowing for a better tailored approach, it should be concluded that there are 
possible synergies occurring from a merger between Beam and Pernod Ricard. Nonetheless, 
there is no appropriate method to quantify such synergies, for which assumptions will need to 
be made: 
 Revenue synergies will only be effective after 2013 
 The increase in revenues due to synergies will be computed based on the maximum 
year on year growth between Pernod Ricard revenues, by each segment (region), and 
the year on year growth of the consolidated company revenues also by each segment.  
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What this means is that the year on year growth rate of revenues by segment of the new 
company with synergies will be the maximum between the year on year growth rate of Pernod 
Ricard and the consolidated company without synergies, after 2013. Figure 39 illustrates how 
the new growth rates, reflecting synergies, were computed. 
Figure 39: Forecasted YOY% change in revenues 
Pernod Ricard YOY % change           
 
FY13E FY14E FY15E FY16E FY17E 
      Asia/Rest of the world 11.0% 9.5% 8.5% 7.5% 6.5% 
Americas 3.0% 6.9% 6.0% 5.1% 4.2% 
Europe excl. France -7.9% 3.5% 2.5% 1.5% 0.4% 
France 0.1% 3.9% 2.9% 1.9% 0.9% 
      
Consolidated Company without synergies YOY % change   
 
FY13E FY14E FY15E FY16E FY17E 
      Asia/Rest of the world 10.3% 9.3% 8.3% 7.3% 6.4% 
Americas 5.0% 7.1% 6.1% 5.2% 4.3% 
Europe excl. France -6.3% 3.3% 2.3% 1.3% 0.3% 
France 0.1% 3.9% 2.9% 1.9% 0.9% 
      
Consolidated Company with synergies YOY % change   
 
FY13E FY14E FY15E FY16E FY17E 
      Asia/Rest of the world 10.3% 9.5% 8.5% 7.5% 6.5% 
Americas 5.0% 7.1% 6.1% 6.2% 5.3% 
Europe excl. France -6.3% 3.5% 2.5% 1.5% 0.4% 
France 0.1% 3.9% 2.9% 1.9% 0.9% 
 
The growth rates pointed out in red in the third table are the rates that have changed from the 
“without synergies” scenario to the “synergies” scenario. The rationale of such assumptions is 
basically the joint of the best of both worlds, due to, as mentioned, the ability for the two 
companies to expand their market share and access each other customers’ databases with 
potential useful information. Most importantly however is the ability for Pernod Ricard to take 
Beam brands (in particular its premium bourbon Jim Beam) to the next level in terms of 
distribution and consequently increase its position and growth rates in the markets where 
Beam is not so well positioned, like Europe and Asia. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that 
the post-merger company would not grow at an inferior rate than would Pernod Ricard do by 
itself in any of the regions.  
The two growth rates pointed out in green refer to the assumption, based on an increased 
market share by Pernod portfolio in the U.S. market after some years of consolidation due to 
the already mentioned expanded market share and resources to better tailor Beam’s 
customers. Such assumptions yield that revenue synergies will be 80% due to the increased 
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ability of Pernod to distribute Beam’s premium brands and 20% to an increased potential for 
both brands together to growth in the U.S. market. 
Cost synergies 
Cost synergies as opposed to revenue synergies are in theory easier to implement, identify and 
value. It is a reasonable argument since many of the costs are dependent mainly on internal 
issues that can be controlled. Synergies stemmed from cost reductions are the most common 
type of synergies, and as described above, the acquisition of V&S by Pernod had expected 
synergies deriving from both cost reduction and integration of distribution margin estimated 
between €125m and €150m on annual basis for 2 to 4 years. Approximately 40% of total 
synergies derived from “distribution” synergies (integration of downstream margin, reduction 
of logistics and production costs, optimization of A&P spend…) while 60% were mainly 
generated by “structure cost” synergies (procurement, overheads, commissions…). 
As seen, a merger between Beam and Pernod Ricard should generate several opportunities to 
reduce costs at a consolidated basis, in particular since this is a horizontal merger. Lower 
production costs and higher bargaining power with the suppliers are able to reduce costs of 
revenues. Unfortunately, none of the companies disclose detailed information regarding their 
costs of revenues for which the entire line item will have to be addressed as a whole. Given 
this limitation, it is somewhat difficult to quantify exactly where the synergies may come from, 
if from logistics cost reductions and/or from distribution cost reductions. In order to try to 
compute the impact on cost reduction of a merger with Beam, the cost of revenues were 
decomposed by region. It will be assumed the same distribution than on the V&S deal, with 
40% of total synergies on cost of revenues coming from distribution synergies and 60% from all 
the other structure costs. Furthermore, Pernod Ricard’s costs of revenues in the Americas 
region in the past three years has been accounting for around 25% of the total costs of 
revenues. It is expected that the main cost reduction opportunities that can arise from a 
merger between Pernod Ricard and Beam are due to the increased access and distribution 
network that Beam can offer to Pernod, similarly to what happen with the V&S acquisition in 
2008, which allowed Pernod to benefit from V&S penetration in the US market and its 
distribution agreements. Based on past similar deals (appendix 6), like the one between 
Pernod and V&S, it should be expected a reduction of 2% on the U.S. costs of revenues (thus 
0.5% on total costs of revenues, assuming that 25% of the total cost of revenues will continue 
to be originated essentially in the Americas region). 
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No enterprise cost reduction is complete without some consideration of selling, general and 
administrative (SG&A) expenses since SG&A touches every part of a company. It is common in 
a merger to benefit from some opportunities that would not otherwise been possible without 
the combination of both firms such as: (a) reassigning staff, (b) lowering indirect expenses, 
such as procurement and travel, companywide, (c) creating a flexible cost structure. However, 
based on Pernod Ricard past approaches regarding deals like the one being studied, it should 
not be expected a great reduction regarding costs with staff as Pernod organizational structure 
should not be significantly affected by this deal. Nonetheless, marketing expenses, for 
instance, are one of the main investments undertaken by Pernod Ricard and it is even 
expected to increase at a rate higher than sales in the foreseen years. As such, with the 
alliance with Beam for which SG&A is expected to increase at a rate lower than sales, it can be 
inferred that both effects neutralize each other, thus yielding a new expectation that the 
combined firm will manage its SG&A in a way that allows to capture both firms’ expectations. 
Since Pernod Ricard’s SG&A are supposed to increase above sales due to its high costs in 
marketing, and considering that Beam’s SG&A are supposed to increase below sales, it can be 
assumed that both firms together will manage their marketing expenses in a way that when 
together SG&A expenses can increase at the same level than sales. 
Capital expenditure synergies are not expected to be relevant given the industry and type of 
business in which these companies operate which do not requires extensive investment in 
fixed assets. Also, historical deals in this industry such as the Pernod Ricard and Vin & Sprit 
acquisition, the Beam acquisition of Cooley Distillery, Diageo’s acquisition of Mey Içki have all 
proven that synergies in this industry are more relevant and probable when outcoming from 
distribution cost savings and SG&A expenses’ reductions. 
Financial synergies 
Financial synergies, as opposed to the operating synergies, refer to the opportunities that can 
arise due to the different financial strengths in a consolidation process. Financial synergies 
include tax benefits, diversification, higher debt capacity and uses for excess cash (higher 
expected cash flows and/or lower discount rates).  
Tax benefits do not seem like a potential opportunity for these companies to look for since 
both of them have operational gains thus stopping any future tax deductions that could occur 
from this merger (this is often a cited rationale by managers to engage in a M&A deal). It is 
also not likely that both companies together can have any special opportunity in tax benefits 
from an increasing depreciation which could reduce tax payments, as well as an increasing 
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debt capacity, since both companies’ management have stressed their intention in remaining 
financial flexibility, in particular Pernod Ricard which has been incurring in great efforts to 
deleverage its balance sheet after financing Vin & Sprit acquisition solely with debt in 2008. 
Integration and Restructuring Costs 
M&A deals besides providing with new opportunities, also come with a cost due to the 
necessity for the integration of both companies as well as all restructuring costs that may arise 
for the synergies to play effect. These costs need to be deducted to the synergies value in 
order for a reliable analysis on the value of a merger or acquisition. 
M&A costs start at the very first step of the deal with all the legal costs (lawyers and taxes in 
some cases), consultancy fees for due diligences and investment banks payments to assess the 
deal. After the initial integration costs, in order to better exploit synergies many changes may 
have to be undertaken at a structure level which of course comes at a cost.  
In the case of Beam merger into Pernod Ricard, because it is a horizontal merger, considering 
the synergies identified in this analysis and since there won’t be the need for building a new 
company (from the strategic point of view of the deal, which will be discussed further on in 
this paper, Beam will integrate Pernod Ricard organizational structure), some of the 
mentioned costs won’t have much weight on this deal. One of the biggest costs that may arise 
in a Pernod Beam merger will have to do with its distribution contract agreements.  
Even though, as an outside analyst, there is not the possibility to have inside information 
regarding both companies distribution agreements, it may be reasonable to assume that there 
may be some distribution contracts that are currently in use, to end, in order for new 
agreements to be arranged. This assumption has also an historical basis, since many M&A deal 
within the spirits industry have been mentioned to have expected penalty fees to exit some 
distribution deals. Most notably, one of the successes of Pernod Ricard deal with V&S was the 
lower than expected penalty fees to exit some of the V&S distribution deals, besides higher 
than expected synergies. At the time of the deal V&S had a distribution agreement with 
Maxxium for most major markets outside of the US, for which Pernod Ricard paid to Maxxium 
a $ 86M fee to anticipate the end of the agreement with V&S in order for Pernod to take over 
the distribution of Absolut in most markets outside the U.S. immediately and with no 
associated costs. This enabled Pernod Ricard to implement cost synergies sooner than 
originally expected and thereby leverage the portfolio synergies in these markets through 
an accelerated integration of Absolut within Pernod Ricard.  
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According to Pernod Ricard information the penalty paid to Maxxium represented 
about 60% of the total costs of the merger, and assuming that the costs between 
Pernod Ricard and Beam could be around 20% higher (to reflect the bigger size of Beam 
deal, also around 20%), it will be assumed that the integration and restructuring costs 
should be around € 130M ($ 86M in EUR should be in 2012 about € 65M, which after 
computing the total proportion and increase of 20%, yields a value in EUR of 130M) and 
should be 100% allocated in year 2013 to SG&A expenses.   
5.1.3 Synergies valuation 
The synergies analysis just provided analyzed how opportunities could be created from a 
merger between Beam and Pernod Ricard and how these could be quantified based on 
historical, public, and common sense information. The next analysis studies how the identified 
synergies can be incorporated in the valuation model of the consolidated companies, and what 
is the new value of the combined firms with synergies, and from the differential one can infer 
the value synergies can attain.  
It will be offered an analysis on how these synergies are created by incorporating within the 
valuation model the assumed synergies one by one, and assessing each independent 
contribution to the overall new value of the company. 
Overall, the total value of the consolidation of Beam within Pernod Ricard amounts to € 
51,919M without synergies (appendix 10), as already stated, and to € 55,275M with all the 
estimated synergies considered and without restructuring costs (appendix 11). With 
restructuring costs the value lowers to € 55,176M, thus valuing net synergies at a total value of 
€ 3,257M. Figure 40 illustrates how synergies are allocated to each of its sources and what is 
the impact on the EV of the consolidated company. 
Figure 40: Synergies estimates 
Synergies Value       
€ in millions Value of Synergy EV with Synergy % total synergies 
    Revenue Synergies 872 52,790 26% 
Distribution by Pernod Ricard 697 52,616 21% 
Expanded market share in US 174 52,093 5% 
    Cost Synergies 2,485 54,403 74% 
Distribution 201 52,119 6% 
COGS & other 301 52,220 9% 
SG&A 1,983 53,902 59% 
    Total Synergies 3,356 55,275 100% 
    Distribution Restructuring Costs 99 
  
    Total Net Synergies 3,257 55,176 
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Coherently with the literature on M&A, it is expected that almost three quarters of the 
synergies are due to cost savings, while only one quarter from revenues. Even though it was 
not possible to further segment the SG&A expenses line item, whose expected synergies 
represent 59% of the total synergies, it should be noted that most of these savings should 
outcome from an higher efficiency at internal operations and particularly from a reduction in 
marketing and publicity expenses since such expenses represent one of the biggest 
investments these companies undertake so the potential savings are accordingly higher. 
Distribution however is the secret for a great M&A deal within the spirits industry. Notice in 
figure 40 how distribution shows up three times both in revenue synergies and cost synergies 
and as well as a restructuring cost. In fact, distribution plays a crucial role for companies like 
Beam and Pernod who produce and sell wholesale since it directly affects all of its business 
components. As such, in an M&A deal between companies in the spirits industry one should 
understand that new distribution agreements can lead to the creation of synergies due to 
higher revenues allowed by new distribution of its products in new markets, lower costs of 
distribution due to higher bargaining power next to the distributors and economies of scale, 
and finally costs of breaking up with existing distribution agreements.  Figure 41 illustrates the 
components of synergies as well as is distribution according to its source as well as the 
separate entity gainer of such synergies. 
Figure 41: Synergies distribution 
 
It is assumed that each company’s individual contribution to each synergy determines how 
synergies will be split between the two companies in order to reflect the unique strengths that 
each of the companies brings to the merger. Synergies of a general nature are divided 
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As such, revenue synergies that may be created by the better distribution of Pernod Ricard’s 
network for Beam’s products will be allocated to Pernod, while the “Expanded share in US” 
synergies are allocated to Beam. Altogether, Beam’s allocated synergies represent 21% of the 
value of net synergies, while Pernod is awarded with 79% of the total net synergies. 
5.2 Aspects of the deal  
The following, and final, section of this dissertation will focus on the strategic and structural 
part of the deal. After proposing a merger between Pernod Ricard and Beam, and been 
conducting its entire analysis oriented to the final goal of merging both companies, this is now 
the time to closely study the ultimate step of the deal.  
Resorting to the distinctions already presented in the literature review section, the deal 
between Pernod and Beam will be classified attending to its characteristics, its singularities to 
shareholders, its process of acquisition, in short words: the deal’s “modus operandis” will be 
reviewed. 
5.2.1 Deal’s rationale  
As the spirits industry continues to consolidate, with more than 40 deals taking place in the 
past 14 years, the spirits industry has a constantly changing landscape. The major players 
today have to focus as much as in organic growth as in inorganic growth, and to miss an 
opportunity can have them left behind.  
Throughout the analysis and valuation of Pernod Ricard it was stated how Pernod expects a 
new “normal” growth in its key market (Asia) at high-single digit to low-double digit growth 
rates. Beam on the other hand, is a much more flexible company and its accelerating growth, 
exposure to brown spirits, favorable positions in key international markets and the fact that 
Beam is one of the few non-family influenced spirits pure-plays and has a solid presence in 
bourbon, which is a growing category, have ringed some bells on the market with rumors 
starting to arise on whether Beam could be acquired by one of the bigger players out in the 
market.  
This paper identifies only two probable candidates to acquire Beam at the present date (mid 
2013): Pernod Ricard and Diageo. These are the only two players with enough history, size and 
market position to both have a chance of acquiring Beam as to create value from such an 
operation. Diageo however has other major deals on hands (acquiring a large position in 
United Spirits and long run negotiations to purchase Jose Cuervo Tequila). Meanwhile, Pernod 
has more incentives than Diageo to acquire Beam as bourbon sales outpace vodka in the U.S., 
David Boquinhas Page 73 
 
which is Pernod’s biggest source of income in the U.S. (Absolut brand). Diageo remains the 
leader of the U.S. spirits market, a position it will continue to enjoy until another player gains 
sufficient scale to compete on equal terms. Beam could potentially be the vehicle through 
which Pernod can achieve this. 
5.2.2 Characteristics of the merger 
Type of Deal 
According to the types of deals studied in the literature review chapter, it will be considered 
that the more reasonable scenario for a deal between Pernod Ricard and Beam would 
contemplate a board of directors’ agreement to merge and then seek stockholder approval for 
the combination. This is considered the typical merger scenario which requires at least 50% of 
the shareholders of the target and bidding firm to agree and leads to the full integration of the 
target firm within the acquiring firm. A tender offer scenario where Pernod would announce 
its intention to buy Beam’s outstanding stock at a specific price, thus bypassing the 
management and board of directors could also be possible, although not likely, since from a 
practical standpoint the outcome of the tender offer would end up being the same as the 
merger, if the acquiring firm would succeed in gaining control of the target firm, but would 
turn out to be much more expensive. Thus, if Pernod and Beam boards’ of directors could not 
agree on a merger, Pernod probably would not consider a tender offer at the present time, but 
wait on a changing of conditions. 
Fair price and premium offered 
Assuming a merger scenario, the acquisition price is the price that will be paid by the acquiring 
firm for each of the target firm’s shares after eventual stockholder approval. As mentioned, 
Beam is one of the only non family influence spirits players, for which stockholder approval 
should not be overly difficult under a normal scenario in which the price seems reasonable. 
With that in mind, over the last year, the target firm’s (Beam) average market capitalization 
was, in Euros, € 7,455M. However, the theoretical value computed in the valuation chapter 
concluded that Beam’s equity can worth € 8,809M, which represents an 18% upside potential 
in relation to its last year’s average. Adding the premium for the synergies that should be 
imputed to Beam (€ 689M) and the effective offering price should be close to € 9,498M, which 
yields a € 59.33 per share (which according to the 2013 average USD/EUR yields something like 
$ 78.29 per share). The difference between the acquisition price and the market price prior to 
the acquisition is called the acquisition premium which, at an assumed announcement date at 
the 1st of August of 2013 (market price = $ 65.58/share), is around 19%. 
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Financing 
The financing of the deal has to be carefully analyzed given its influence on the outcome of the 
deal. Beam’s market values (52 week average $ 61.1/share) are underpriced relative to the 
WACC approach valuation circa 10% ($ 76.7), underpriced compared to analysts’ consensus 
(around $ 69.9), and only in line with its peer group valuation. If the DCF valuation presented 
in this paper as well as the analysts’ valuations are correctly valuing Beam, then this should be 
a good timing for Pernod Ricard to make a move on Beam, as the company is trading at a 
discount.  
On the other hand, Pernod Ricard also seems to be trading at a discount. According to the DCF 
valuation, Pernod’s shares are worth € 119.1 each. Similarly, the peer group valuation carried 
also indicates a fair value of around € 111, while analysts’ forecast a more conservative share 
value of € 97.2. Nonetheless, the highest value in the past 52 weeks was only € 101.2, and the 
lowest was € 82.31. The fact that also Pernod Ricard may be trading at a discount to its fair 
value indicates that this is probably a bad timing to issue equity, which would cause Pernod to 
avoid financing such deal with stock. Also, stylized facts on M&A, according to Sirower & Sahni 
(2006) have proved that cash deals outperform stock deals. However the main reason should 
be tied to the fact that the Ricard family, stockholders of Pernod Ricard, desire to maintain its 
influence over the group which will most likely lead to debt being favored over equity. 
All of the conditions seem to favor a debt financed acquisition; nonetheless, the impact on 
capital structure needs to be taken into account. Pernod Ricard took on a lot of leverage to 
finance its 2008 V&S acquisition and has been deleveraging its Balance Sheet ever since. 
However, as already presented, the consolidated Debt to Capitalization ratio is around 32%. 
According to Damodaran online data, a ratio of Debt to Capitalization for a BBB company in the 
US can go until around 50%. This allows for an inference, since the consolidated company 
holds in 2012 around € 12Bn of debt and maintains a 32% debt to capitalization ratio (A- 
rating), then it could go on to around € 20Bn before putting its A- rating at risk. This should 
yield something like € 8Bn that can be raised additionally by Pernod Ricard before the merged 
company suffers any downgrade by agency ratings. It should be taken into account that 
Pernod Ricard holds close to € 800M of cash & cash equivalents in 2012. Since a merger 
between Pernod and Beam would not require that Pernod had to acquire the entire 
shareholder structure, it can be stated that Pernod can have sufficient resources in cash 
through its reserves and debt issuances that can finance the deal without resorting to stock 
deals.  
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5.2.3 Final considerations 
Considering Pernod Ricard’s current organizational structure, Beam could be integrated within 
its Brand Companies (just like V&S was), as it is illustrated in figure 41. 
Figure 42: New organizational structure  
 
Pernod Ricard’s decentralized organizational structure is a main advantage for this deal. 
Nonetheless, some considerations regarding the proposed deal should be made.  
Even though it is out of the scope of this paper to analyze it on detail, it is the author’s belief 
that this deal can have further room for improvements with the spin-off of some of Beam’s 
brands. A merger between Pernod and Beam could ultimately lead Pernod to be the number 
one premium spirits producer ahead of Diageo whose brands are not exclusively focused on 
premium. Pernod strategy however has been more and more focused on the premium brands, 
and an acquisition of Beam would allow Pernod to explore both premium and value category 
products of Beam, or it could sell the value category brands and reinvest it on the rest of its 
premium portfolio. Thus, Pernod should focus on Beam’s two sections: Power Brands and 
Rising Stars. These two divisions produce and market brands like Jim Beam, Maker’s Mark, 
Courvoisier and Skinnygirl. This opinion reflects the personal opinion of the author based on 
the state of the industry and prospects for both companies. The acquisition of solely these two 
brands is not suggested as it would be very unlikely Beam’s shareholders would approve such 
an operation at a price that would create value for Pernod. Also, one of the factors that 
probably make Beam so attractive to be acquired is probably the existence of these value 
brands. 
On a final note, even though the merger between Pernod and Beam is being proposed as 
happening in August 2013, it should be noted that there may be some better moments to go 
ahead with this deal. This suggestion is mostly due to the fact that Pernod can be constrained 
by its Balance Sheet and shareholding structure to do the deal in the next year. Although there 
is room for Pernod to finance this acquisition through debt and maintain a somewhat stable 
rating outlook, the company would lose some of its flexibility which can be of utmost 
importance in the spirits industry. 
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6. Conclusion 
The spirits industry is one of those industries who seem to insist on consolidation. Over the 
years this industry landscape has been constantly changing and is now ruled by some major 
players. The major players however are very distinct one from another, and the leader today 
may not be the leader tomorrow. This industry is constantly changing and demographics, 
technology and emerging markets development mold the demand for alcoholic beverages.  
Pernod Ricard has been following a strategy of organic growth combined with M&A deals to 
boost its growth. At the same time, Beam has returning higher than expected growth ever 
since it was separated from Fortune Brands in 2011. Beam seemed like an immediate takeover 
target, however the American company’s progress has been extraordinary and is now getting 
to a value when it becomes almost unreachable for most of its potential bidders. 
As such, the possible merger between Pernod Ricard and Beam seems to be getting near to its 
most advantageous timing (although it may be possible to happen in the near future under 
better conditions). At this time (August 2013) Pernod Ricard could attempt to merger with 
Beam, and according to the valuations presented, offer a conservative premium of 19% ($ 
78/share) to its last year’s average price ($ 61/share) that reflected Beam’s fair value with 
potential synergies, in a deal financed with debt. Pernod Ricard could definitely take Beam on 
to the next level due to its distribution supremacy in key growing markets, and Beam could 
take huge advantageous from its super growing demand by bourbon to reach new markets 
and consolidated a position for its brands.  
Revenue synergies are estimated to make up 26% of total synergies while cost synergies the 
rest. As it was seen, changes and opportunities in distribution are the most important for a 
successful M&A between companies like Pernod and Beam. Whether it is by the opportunities 
to enhance sales of certain brands with new distribution agreements on new markets, or by 
the costs the same exact new deals can save, or even by the costs the breakup of existent 
agreements can create, distribution is the center of the possible value of synergies in a deal 
like this one, thus needing to be well managed. 
Mergers, and acquisitions, of firms have always been a natural strategy used by businesses 
with the intent to grow, prosper and deliver value for its investors and customers. 
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7. Appendixes 
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Appendix 3: Growth by Spirit Variety
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Appendix 4: Pernod Ricard Market Share in the US 
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Appendix 6: Spirits Industry M&A deals between 2010 and 2011 
 
 
Appendix 7: S&P ratings according to Damodaran on-line data 
For large non-financial service companies with market cap > $ 5 billion 
(source: Damodaran January 2013) 
     If interest coverage ratio is 
 > ≤ to Rating is Spread is 
8.5 100000 AAA 0.40% 
6.5 8.499999 AA 0.70% 
5.5 6.499999 A+ 0.85% 
4.25 5.499999 A 1.00% 
3 4.249999 A- 1.30% 
2.5 2.999999 BBB 2.00% 
2.25 2.49999 BB+ 3.00% 
2 2.2499999 BB 4.00% 
1.75 1.999999 B+ 5.50% 
1.5 1.749999 B 6.50% 
1.25 1.499999 B- 7.25% 
0.8 1.249999 CCC 8.75% 
0.65 0.799999 CC 9.50% 
0.2 0.649999 C 10.50% 
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Appendix 8: Beam’s Valuation 
Income Statement             
$ in millions, year end December FY10 Δ % FY11 Δ % FY12 Δ % 
       North America 1,162 n.a. 1,272 9.5% 1,451 14.1% 
Eur/MidEast/Africa (EMEA) 478 n.a. 506 5.9% 513 1.3% 
Asia Pac/South America (APSA) 455 n.a. 487 7.1% 503 3.1% 
Revenues 2,095 n.a. 2,265 8.1% 2,466 8.9% 
  - Cost of Revenue 865 n.a. 988 14.2% 1,028 4.0% 
Gross Profit 1,230 n.a. 1,323 7.6% 1,438 8.7% 
  - Selling, General & Admin Expense 740 n.a. 805 8.8% 829 3.0% 
EBIT (Operating Income) 490 n.a. 518 5.8% 610 17.6% 
       
CAPEX -223 n.a. -219 -2.0% -137 -37.5% 
Depreciation 245 n.a. 199 -18.6% 111 -44.6% 
Net Working Capital 2,236 n.a. 1,676 -25.1% 1,655 -1.2% 
Δ NWC n.a  -560  -21  
 
 
Income Statement Projections       
 
CAGR   
$ in millions, year end December FY13E FY14E FY15E FY16E FY17E 
 
FY10/12 FY13E/17E 
         North America 1,581 1,700 1,819 1,937 2,053 
 
11.7% 6.7% 
Eur/MidEast/Africa (EMEA) 527 541 552 559 563 
 
3.6% 1.7% 
Asia Pac/South America (APSA) 527 569 611 654 695 
 
5.1% 7.2% 
Revenues 2,635 2,809 2,982 3,149 3,312 
 
8.5% 5.9% 
  - Cost of Revenue 1,098 1,157 1,213 1,265 1,314 
 
9.0% 4.6% 
Gross Profit 1,537 1,653 1,769 1,884 1,998 
 
8.1% 6.8% 
  - Selling, General & Admin Expense 891 922 949 971 988 
 
5.8% 2.6% 
EBIT (Operating Income) 646 731 820 914 1,010 
 
11.5% 11.8% 
         CAPEX -146 -127 -105 -80 -51 
 
-21.8% -23.2% 
Depreciation 118 98 74 47 16 
 
-32.9% -39.4% 
Net Working Capital 1,567 1,650 1,728 1,802 1,870 
 
-14.0% 4.5% 





Discounted Cash Flow   Explicit Period       
FCFF 
 
572 467 540 618 698 
PV FCFF 
 
533 405 436 465 489 
Terminal Value 
     
16,440 
PV Terminal Value 
     
11,518 
       Total Enterprise Value 
 
    
14,413 
Less: Total Debt 
     
2,505 
Plus: Cash 
     
366 
Implied Equity Value 
 
    
12,274 
Shares Outstanding 
     
160 
Implied Share Price 
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Appendix 9: Pernod Ricard’s Valuation 
Income Statement             
€ in millions, year end June FY10 Δ % FY11 Δ % FY12 Δ % 
       
Revenues 7,081 -1.7% 7,643 7.9% 8,215 7.5% 
  - Cost of Revenue 2,863 -4.4% 3,033 5.9% 3,169 4.5% 
Gross Profit 4,218 0.2% 4,610 9.3% 5,046 9.5% 
  - Selling, General & Admin Expense 2,422 2.5% 2,701 11.5% 2,933 8.6% 
EBIT (Operating Income) 1,796 -2.7% 1,909 6.3% 2,113 10.7% 
CAPEX -184 -23.7% -223 21.2% -271 21.5% 
Depreciation 267 -21.7% 202 -24.3% 182 -9.9% 
Net Working Capital 1,942 -27.3% 3,113 60.3% 2,814 -9.6% 
Δ NWC -730 -367.4% 1,171 -260.4% -299 -125.5% 
 
Income Statement Projections         
 
CAGR   
€ in millions, year end June FY13E FY14E FY15E FY16E FY17E 
 
FY08/12 FY13E/17E 
         
Revenues 8,460 9,046 9,589 10,077 10,496 
 
5.7% 5.5% 
  - Cost of Revenue 3,437 3,675 3,895 4,094 4,264 
 
2.9% 5.5% 
Gross Profit 5,023 5,371 5,694 5,983 6,232 
 
7.6% 5.5% 
  - Selling, General & Admin 
Expense 3,020 3,275 3,520 3,749 3,957 
 
6.9% 7.0% 
EBIT (Operating Income) 2,003 2,096 2,174 2,234 2,275 
 
8.6% 3.2% 
CAPEX -276 -295 -313 -329 -342 
 
-0.2% 5.5% 
Depreciation 269 288 305 321 334 
 
1.9% 5.5% 
Net Working Capital 2,975 3,181 3,372 3,543 3,691 
 
4.1% 5.5% 




Discounted Cash Flow   Explicit Period       
FCFF 
 
1,365 1,391 1,465 1,530 1,585 
PV FCFF 
 
1,281 1,225 1,211 1,188 1,155 
Terminal Value 
     
46,116 
PV Terminal Value 
     
33,596 
       Total Enterprise Value 
  
   
40,932 
Less: Total Debt 
     
10,176 
Plus: Cash 
     
787 
Less: Minority Interest 
     
168 
Implied Equity Value 
  
   
31,375 
Shares Outstanding 
     
264 
Implied Share Price 
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Appendix 10: After-Merger Valuation without synergies 
Income Statement             
€ in millions, year end June FY10 Δ % FY11 Δ % FY12 Δ % 
       Revenues 8,649 0.0% 9,393 8.6% 10,084 7.4% 
  - Cost of Revenue 3,510 0.0% 3,796 8.1% 3,948 4.0% 
Gross Profit 5,138 0.0% 5,597 8.9% 6,136 9.6% 
  - Selling, General & Admin Expense 2,976 0.0% 3,323 11.7% 3,561 7.2% 
EBIT (Operating Income) 2,163 0.0% 2,274 5.1% 2,575 13.2% 
CAPEX -351 0.0% -392 11.7% -374 -4.4% 
Depreciation 450 0.0% 356 -20.9% 266 -25.4% 
Net Working Capital 1,942 0.0% 3,113 60.3% 2,814 -9.6% 
Δ NWC n.a. n.a. 793 0.0% -340 -142.9% 
 
Income Statement Projections         
 
CAGR   
€ in millions, year end June FY13E FY14E FY15E FY16E FY17E 
 
FY10/12 FY13E/17E 
         Revenues 10,457 11,171 11,832 12,422 12,931 
 
3.9% 5.5% 
  - Cost of Revenue 4,269 4,550 4,807 5,035 5,230 
 
3.0% 5.2% 
Gross Profit 6,188 6,621 7,024 7,386 7,701 
 
4.5% 5.6% 
  - Selling, General & Admin Expense 3,696 3,972 4,233 4,472 4,684 
 
4.6% 6.1% 
EBIT (Operating Income) 2,492 2,649 2,791 2,915 3,018 
 
4.5% 4.9% 
CAPEX -386 -391 -392 -388 -380 
 
1.6% -0.4% 
Depreciation 359 362 361 356 346 
 
-12.4% -0.9% 
Net Working Capital 2,949 3,153 3,342 3,512 3,659 
 
9.7% 5.5% 




Discounted Cash Flow   Explicit Period     
FCFF 
 
1,695 1,657 1,806 1,949 2,083 
PV FCFF 
 
1,590 1,457 1,489 1,507 1,510 
Terminal Value 
     
58,928 
PV Terminal Value 
     
42,729 
       Total Enterprise Value 
  
   
51,919 
Less: Total Debt 
     
10,176 
Plus: Cash 
     
787 
Implied Equity Value 
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Appendix 11: After-Merger Valuation with synergies 
Income Statement Projections         
 
CAGR   
€ in millions, year end June FY13E FY14E FY15E FY16E FY17E 
 
FY10/12 FY13E/17E 
         Revenues 10,457 11,182 11,855 12,459 12,981 
 
3.9% 5.6% 
  - Cost of Revenue 4,247 4,527 4,783 5,010 5,204 
 
3.0% 5.2% 
Gross Profit 6,209 6,655 7,072 7,449 7,777 
 
4.5% 5.8% 
  - Selling, General & Admin Expense 3,826 3,948 4,182 4,390 4,570 
 
4.6% 4.5% 
EBIT (Operating Income) 2,384 2,707 2,890 3,058 3,207 
 
4.5% 7.7% 
CAPEX -386 -391 -392 -388 -380 
 
1.6% -0.4% 
Depreciation 359 362 361 356 346 
 
-12.4% -0.9% 
Net Working Capital 2,949 3,153 3,342 3,512 3,659 
 
9.7% 5.5% 




Discounted Cash Flow   Explicit Period     
FCFF 
 
1,612 1,701 1,881 2,059 2,227 
PV FCFF 
 
1,512 1,496 1,551 1,592 1,615 
Terminal Value 
     
63,018 
PV Terminal Value 
     
45,694 
       
Total Enterprise Value 
  
   
55,176 
Less: Total Debt 
     
10,176 
Plus: Cash 
     
787 
Implied Equity Value 
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